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ABSTRACT 
Being present in the European Union’s (EU) strategic documents and commonly used in 
political statements, “strategic autonomy” has become one of the latest catchphrases in 
European security and defence discourse. The ambiguous nature of this concept has led 
to concerns that it may have different meanings among the EU member states and the lack 
of common understanding may hamper the practical cooperation working towards this 
end. Informed by constructivist theorising on meaning-making across national contexts 
and the notions of constructive/destructive ambiguity, this thesis seeks to substantiate the 
debates on European strategic autonomy by providing empirical insights to it. 
The aims of this study are twofold. Drawing on original data from 23 expert interviews, 
first, in order to establish the empirical picture of the diversity of meanings of the notion 
of EU strategic autonomy, it maps out the national understandings of the concept in 
France, the Netherlands, Germany, Finland, and Estonia. Second, in order to assess the 
implications of the multiplicity of interpretations for cooperation, the study then explores 
how the actors themselves perceive the issue of diverging understandings in the context 
of practical cooperation taking place in the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) 
framework.  
As regards to the multiple understandings of the concept of strategic autonomy, the 
findings of this study show that the core meaning of it is similar for all the analysed 
member states, that being “Europe’s capacity to act as Europe in security and defence 
related matters”. However, divergences emerge in relation to more reflective issues, such 
as aiming for self-sufficiency or seeing gradual capability development as an end in itself; 
the degree of exclusivity implied by this ambition; and whether a European drive in the 
direction of autonomy is perceived as a potential threat to transatlantic values.  
In terms of the impact of the multiplicity of interpretations on practical cooperation, the 
second key finding of this study suggests that the ambiguity of the notion of strategic 
autonomy is not necessarily hindering to practical cooperation that is taking place in the 
EU frameworks aimed to support this ambition. Rather, the policy-makers across the 
member states perceive the cooperative action itself as something that leads to more 
clarity and eventually helps to pinpoint the collective understanding of the goals to be 
achieved.  
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Over the last few years, the European security and defence cooperation has gained new 
momentum. A milestone was reached in 2016 with the new Global Strategy for the 
European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS). The document was released 
during a time of notable shift in European strategic thought driven by a number of internal 
and external pressures. Internal factors included the Brexit vote and the changed political 
dynamics in many European states, feeding into rising public demands for security (see 
Tocci, 2016, 2017). Externally, the Europe was not only witnessing continuous instability 
at its borders, but also rising tensions in the relationships of the West with Russia and 
China, as well as transatlantic strains (see also Alcaro et al., 2016). All of it took place in 
a strategic environment increasingly dominated by new security threats and general 
volatility. These developments led the EU to make the promise of picking up a greater 
responsibility for the security of its member states with a focus on capacity building and 
developing better response to crises. In doing so, a renewed emphasis was put on the idea 
of strategic autonomy. 
The concept of strategic autonomy has made its appearance in the debates surrounding 
the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) before, prominently at least since 
the 1998 Saint-Malo Declaration, where the notion that “the Union must have the capacity 
for autonomous action” was conceived (Franco-British St. Malo Declaration, 1998, 2). 
Yet, never has it drawn as much attention as now. With this attention has also come a 
notable amount of confusion. According to the EU Global Strategy: “An appropriate level 
of ambition and strategic autonomy is important for Europe’s ability to promote peace 
and security within and beyond its borders” (EUGS, 2016, 9, emphasis added). While this 
goal undeniably carries an important message, it does not offer much clarity. Fast-forward 
a couple of years, several new defence initiatives and countless political statements, some 
more controversial than others (see e.g. Maas, 2018; Macron, 2018) and the ambiguity 
surrounding the term has only increased. Dissatisfied with this state of affairs, scholars 
and policy-makers alike are trying to define the concept of “strategic autonomy” (e.g. 
Mauro, 2018; Varga, 2017), but for the time being its meaning remains elusive. 
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In the broadest possible sense, the EU itself has defined strategic autonomy in terms of 
ability to “act alone when necessary and with partners whenever possible” in matters of 
security and defence (European External Action Service, 2018). In some more detail, the 
Global Strategy highlighted the importance of the industrial component for strategic 
autonomy and further proposed developing a comprehensive defence strategy that would 
determine the tasks, capabilities requirements, and priorities of the member states that 
should form the basis of the Union’s renewed defence ambitions (EUGS, 2016, 45). The 
focus on capacity-building has later been backed up with several new initiatives, such as 
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), European Defence Fund (EDF) and the 
Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD). In academic circles, “strategic 
autonomy” is commonly referred to through its three dimensions: political (decision-
making), operational (action), and industrial (capabilities) autonomy (e.g. Arteaga, 2017; 
Kempin and Kunz, 2017). More recently, the proposed definitions of “strategic 
autonomy” have expanded well beyond the dimension of defence policy, and encompass 
the EU’s capacity for autonomous action in the entire spectrum of foreign and security 
policy (Lippert et al., 2019). 
The abovementioned documents and academic debates help to understand the direction 
that the EU has taken (or should take according to the EU policy-makers) in order to 
become a more capable actor in the field of security and defence. In spite of those broad 
lines of meaning of “strategic autonomy”, the overall picture still remains fragmented. 
This is because, as the observers have noted (see e.g. Bartels et al., 2017; Drent, 2018; 
Puhl, 2018), different member states understand the notion of strategic autonomy 
differently. Given the openness of the term to divergent national interpretations, the 
prospect of reaching a common understanding of this strategic objective at the EU level 
becomes highly questionable. As a result, the prospects of practical cooperation towards 
this end may be equally put in doubt (Mauro, 2018, 27; Puhl, 2018, 2). While the 
discussions about the diverging understandings of the concept of strategic autonomy and 
the practical implications of this multiplicity of interpretations are present, the empirical 
reality remains largely unexplored. This both in terms of what those multiple national 
understandings of the goal of European strategic autonomy are (where do they diverge 
and where do they overlap) and whether the lack of a shared understanding in fact poses 
a substantial obstacle to practical cooperation aimed to achieve this objective.  
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Addressing the existing gap in research, this thesis seeks to explore the following two 
questions. First, what are the meanings given to the term “strategic autonomy” by the EU 
member states? And second, how do the divergent understandings of “strategic 
autonomy” among the EU member states affect their practical cooperation to achieve this 
goal? Whereas the first question allows to establish the empirical reality of the member 
states’ interpretations of strategic autonomy, the second, building on the findings of the 
first, then allows to investigate the practical implications of the aforementioned plurality. 
With regard to the impact of the multiplicity of understandings of the notion of strategic 
autonomy on EU defence cooperation, this question is explored in an open-ended manner, 
arguing that the mere fact that the same linguistic concept can have multiple divergent 
meanings among different state actors is neither good nor bad a priori with regard to 
practical cooperation. This open-ended theoretical perspective is informed by two 
different strands of literature, one of which suggests that cooperation can be hindered by 
normative divergence and under-conceptualisation of collective goals (e.g. Tardy, 2018), 
while the other explores the notion of constructive ambiguity, which refers to the 
deliberate use of open language with the aim to leave room for national interpretations 
and foster cooperation (e.g. Rayroux, 2013).  
In order to answer the proposed research questions, this study carries out two main 
research tasks. First, it maps out five different national understandings of the notion of 
strategic autonomy by exploring the cases of France, the Netherlands, Germany, Finland, 
and Estonia. The case selection takes into consideration the Atlanticist – Europeanist 
divide in strategic cultures in order to capture the widest possible range of the divergent 
interpretations of “strategic autonomy”. The comparison of the five cases seeks to give 
indication how sharp is the contrast between the national understandings of the concept 
of strategic autonomy, simultaneously serving as a reference point to the second part of 
the empirical analysis. The second half of the empirical part then investigates the member 
states’ perceptions about the implications of those multiple interpretations for 
cooperation, focusing on the case of PESCO as the most telling example of a platform for 
cooperative action aimed at European defence capability development and political 
integration. Without aiming to establish a strict causal relationship between the divergent 
understandings of strategic autonomy and levels of cooperation, the analysis instead 
provides initial insights into effect on cooperation – as perceived by the actors themselves. 
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The data used in this research relies on expert interviews. In total, 23 government officials 
and policy analysts across the five country cases were interviewed to provide an 
empirically-grounded account on the topic. Being directly involved in the process of 
generating and articulating the meanings given to “strategic autonomy” and present in the 
arenas of practical cooperation, interviewing decision-makers offers original insights that 
are not available elsewhere. A set of analytical categories were defined based on the 
conceptual underpinnings of this research to analyse the gathered data. The divergent 
national understandings of “strategic autonomy” were explored and compared to each 
other focusing on the following aspects: the defining elements of strategic autonomy, 
exclusivity and inclusivity as it relates to strategic autonomy, realisation of strategic 
autonomy, and the fit of this ambition into the current regional security architecture. The 
matters concerning the impact of the multiple understandings on practical cooperation 
within the PESCO framework were examined based on the experts’ assessment of 
PESCO as a tool facilitating strategic autonomy, their perceptions about the interplay 
between ambiguity and cooperation, and what they identified as the main fault lines that 
divide the member states. 
The reminder of this thesis is divided into five sections. The first Chapter lays out the 
theoretical framework of the study. Drawing on constructivist research on meaning 
construction and literature on strategic culture, it puts forward an account of divergent 
understandings, how come different states interpret the same strategic objective in 
significantly different ways. Then, the Chapter proceeds by discussing the effect of this 
multiplicity of understandings on cooperative action. The second section of the study 
describes the research methodology utilised. The general description of the research 
design is followed by an overview of data collection. The third Chapter, representing the 
bulk of this study, presents the analysis of how the notion of strategic autonomy is 
understood in five EU member states: France, the Netherlands, Germany, Finland, and 
Estonia. The fourth section then explores if the divergence of national interpretations of 
the EU’s defence goal of strategic autonomy has had any significant negative effects on 
the cooperation taking place within the PESCO framework. Finally, the thesis concludes 
with a discussion on the research findings. 
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1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This section lays out the theoretical grounding of the study by addressing two key issues. 
First, it explores the emergence of diverging national understandings of specific security 
and defence goals even if they are in principle defined by a common denominator (i.e. a 
concrete term, or agreed upon set of priorities). This is done by combining insights from 
the literature on critical constructivism, which assigns meaning an important role in world 
politics, with a framework of strategic culture. Second, it considers the practical 
implications of the multiplicity of understandings for security cooperation. In doing so, 
two different strands of literature are discussed, one of which suggests that cooperation 
can be hindered by the under-conceptualisation of collective goals, while the other 
introduces the notion of constructive ambiguity, which refers to the deliberate use of open 
language with the aim to facilitate cooperation. The theoretical discussion departs from a 
purely conceptual starting point, then moving towards the EU-specific context.  
  
1.1. Meaning Construction and Context Plurality 
 
At the most basic level, “strategic autonomy” is simply a word; a linguistic concept; a 
signifier that has no meaning in itself. Poststructuralist scholars in particular have pointed 
out that all meaning is in principle undetermined and never objective (see Torfing, 1999). 
Instead, it is “decided” or “articulated” by social actors, be it individuals, communities, 
or states, and always context-specific (Milliken, 1999, 229). From a constructivist 
perspective, it is the unique discursive context of background knowledge and experiences 
that shape the actors’ understandings of linguistic concepts that mark different norms, 
ideas and goals (Wiener, 2017, 114). This background may be cultural, institutional, 
social or otherwise. As such, it follows that state-level interpretations of the same 
linguistic concept differ across international borders (Ibid.). Literature has exemplified 
these dynamics more extensively in the case of international norms and polysemy of 
institutions (e.g. Costa-Buranelli, 2015; Wiener, 2008, 2014). The same logic is arguably 
at play in the case of EU defence cooperation and the common pursuit by member states 
of “strategic autonomy” at the EU level.  
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As indicated above, two aspects are central to the multiplicity of meanings: divergent 
interpretive contexts and the inherent openness of language. In regard to international 
relations, this manifests itself as a contextual duality of national and international 
interpretive backgrounds. More specifically, internationally validated concepts, whether 
it be norms or strategic goals, and their meanings are agreed upon in global/regional elite 
communities but interpreted, negotiated and applied in diverse domestic contexts (see 
Wiener, 2008). This dynamic helps create a fit with local customary beliefs, but carries 
with it the potential for misunderstandings at the international level (Wiener, 2017, 114). 
Returning to the specificities of defining the meaning of “strategic autonomy”, it therefore 
can be argued that being a strategic objective that is part of the EU security and defence 
discourse, the concept already comes with a degree of context-specific meaning. 
However, in as much as concepts at the international level are dependent on domestic 
level interpretation (what Wiener calls “cultural validation”), the divergent national 
understandings of this concept are largely dependent on diverse national interpretative 
contexts – which for strategic issues can be defined as strategic culture.  
Most conceptualisations of strategic culture are quite broad, incorporating references to 
ideas, norms, attitudes, beliefs, historical experiences and collective memories, as well as 
patterns of behaviour, habits, and traditions (Gray, 1999; Heiselberg, 2003; Johnston, 
1995; Longhurst, 2004). Despite the absence of a common definition, most of those who 
use the term tend to agree that strategic culture is rooted in the early or formative 
experiences of the state, whereas ahistorical and material variables such as technology, 
institutional setup, or relative capabilities are of secondary importance (Johnston, 1995, 
34). However, geography, for example, can play a significant role in the development of 
a state’s strategic culture, under the condition that its importance for strategic choices has 
been passed on from one generation of decision-makers to the next. Therefore, what 
matters here are the historical experiences of geography or other material conditions that 
have gradually evolved into persistent beliefs that affect strategic thinking (Snyder, 1977, 
8). Strategic culture as the sum of the aforementioned formative experiences and 
ideational predispositions can therefore be pinpointed as the “interpretive context” that 
shapes the actors’ understandings of strategic objectives, such as EU strategic autonomy. 
Along those lines, Johnston (1995, 45) defines strategic culture as an ideational milieu 
that consists of “shared assumptions and decision rules” that frame collective conceptions 
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of the social, organisational and political surroundings. These presumptions focus 
attention on certain features of events and behaviour, mark down the red lines that shall 
not be crossed, identify the priorities and secondary issues, essentially functioning like a 
“lens of interpretation”. By being transplanted into this cultural context, strategic issues, 
or security and defence concepts thereof, acquire a specific meaning. As such, notions 
like “collective defence”, “cooperative security”, “utility of military force”, or “strategic 
autonomy” are given divergent meanings across state borders. For example, a country 
with an established tradition of self-reliance and independence as the defining element of 
its strategic culture can be expected to have a different understanding of the 
aforementioned concepts compared to a state whose security has historically been built 
upon strong partnerships. What is considered to be a political principle by one, can easily 
be interpreted as a measure of last resort by the other. Where one sees contradiction, the 
other can argue for complementarity. Hence, seemingly the same security objective 
becomes open to multiple meanings. 
With the development of CSDP, the notion of strategic culture is now often invoked also 
in the context of the EU. On the one hand, there are rather convincing arguments made 
regarding the dynamics of Europeanisation in the field of foreign and security policies of 
the EU member states that allow to speak about a convergence towards a shared strategic 
culture (Hill and Wong, 2011; Meyer, 2005; Riemer, 2005). This process by means of 
providing a single interpretative context for strategic issues, could potentially lessen the 
issue of multiple interpretations of the same strategic concept at the EU level. Other 
scholars, however, contend that the differences among national strategic cultures in 
Europe are large and persistent, therefore the member states are still far away from 
establishing a shared understanding about to what common security and defence should 
entail and how far the EU should go in this field (Lindley-French, 2002; Rynning, 2003; 
Tardy, 2007). Here, this study follows the latter view – at least to the extent that national 
strategic culture/interpretative context is still dominant. This indicates that with 
continuing dominance of national strategic cultures, meanings given to specific strategic 
objectives at the EU level remain divergent and iterative social interaction is not necessary 
conductive to the shared interpretation.  
While in principle it would not be incorrect to say that the EU’s starting point is one in 
which there are 28 states with different strategic cultures, it is analytically somewhat 
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incomprehensible. Instead, the pattern of strategic cultures in the EU can be thought of as 
a nuanced mix of similarities and differences, or clusters. More specifically, Howorth 
(2002, 90) has outlined six types of divergences in EU member state national security 
cultures: allied/neutral, Atlanticist/Europeanist, professional power projection/conscript-
based territorial defence, nuclear/non-nuclear, military/civilian instruments, large/small 
states and weapon providers/consumers. These divergences capture the most significant 
variations in the EU member states’ security-cultural backgrounds, covering a wide range 
of issues from strategic orientations to matters related to relative military power. As such, 
these six cultures provide six distinctive interpretative contexts for meaning-
making/cultural validation of EU level strategic concepts. 
While all the six divergences can be expected to account for the different understandings 
of “strategic autonomy”, the decisive divide can considered to be the one between 
Atlanticists and Europeanists. There are multiple reasons to it. First and foremost, the 
current regional security architecture undeniably positions the notion of strategic 
autonomy vis-à-vis the US and NATO (see e.g. Howorth, 2018). This ties directly into 
the stark contrasts between the assumptions about the appropriate institutional 
architecture for the security arrangements of the continent, key partnerships and preferred 
formats of cooperation that all remain central to defining European strategic autonomy as 
a strategic objective. Second, the Atlanticist – Europeanist divide has been identified as 
one of the key fault-lines throughout the development of the CSDP (Jonson, 2006, 67), 
reflecting the fragmented views of the overall meaning of this project now of which the 
goal of strategic autonomy is part of. Therefore, meanings of “strategic culture”, national-
level interpretations, can be expected to vary primarily according this divergence. The 
focus on the Atlanticist-Europeanist divide will be relevant mainly in respect of the case 
selection in the empirical part of this study 
Departing from this principle of openness of language and context plurality, this thesis 
argues that the notion of European strategic autonomy being open to divergent national 
understandings is inevitable. The EU broad definition of strategic autonomy as the 
capacity to “act alone when necessary and with partners whenever possible” in matters of 
security and defence (European External Action Service, 2018) that has been backed up 
with an increased focus on capability development leaves a significant amount of room 
for varied national interpretations. Even if all the member states would agree that the idea 
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of strategic autonomy is capacity-driven and/or action-oriented, many unanswered 
questions prevail. This because the EU level conceptualisation by itself does not specify 
what strategic autonomy as a strategic objective means, nor unequivocally specify 
behavioural prescriptions. Defining this meaning and its practical implications at the 
national level requires cultural validation, which translates into answering questions, such 
as: What should “strategic autonomy” entail? How to best achieve this goal? How does 
this ambition relate to core transatlantic values? As a result, diverging interpretations can 
be expected across different strategic cultures. This multiplicity of understandings feeds 
into ambiguity, and vice versa. 
 
1.2. Cooperation in the Field of Security and Defence: Hindered by Conceptual 
Ambiguity or Not? 
 
After exploring the notion of diversity in national interpretations of a single linguistic 
concept, the question that arises is that why does it even matter? Or to put it differently, 
what are the practical implications of the multiple understandings? This is not only an 
abstract theoretical question, but directly connects to the ongoing debates on the 
ambiguity of the notion European strategic autonomy (e.g. Drent, 2018; Mauro, 2018). 
Several authors have highlighted the link between collective action dilemmas and 
conceptual ambiguity – the phenomenon that was discussed in the previous section – i.e. 
that linguistic concepts that refer to norms, ideas or specific strategic objectives do not 
have the same meaning for different state actors (Checkel, 2001; Risse, 2000; Tardy, 
2018). While there is a broad agreement that cooperation between social actors requires 
a degree of “common knowledge”, or a collective supply of interpretations, the literature 
remains divided on whether this shared understanding rests on precision or ambiguity, 
and whether the multiplicity of interpretations should be “governed away” or left to be 
resolved naturally as the meanings of linguistic concepts are put into use. The following 
discussion explores both ends of this argument, focusing on the specifics of EU security 
and defence cooperation. 
It has become a frequent claim that within the field of security and defence integration, 
the notion of “substantial rationality” alone does not explain state behaviour (Jonson, 
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2006, 245) and cooperative action is often hampered precisely by normative splits (Krotz 
and Maher, 2011, 565). Conceptual ambiguity can be seen as a reflection of those 
divergences. As explained in the precious Chapter, when presented with a policy goal in 
a form of a linguistic concept, each state is inclined to translate it into its own strategic 
language; define the meaning of the concept based on national background knowledge 
and experiences. Divergent interpretations, in turn, bottom-up from national to 
international level, subsuming a range of meanings under a common term result in the 
ambiguity of the concept. This, however, has potentially a negative effect on the prospects 
of cooperation, as the states lack a common ground for action (see e.g. Mahoney and 
Thelen, 2010). Instead, disagreements and conflicts are expected to arise because the 
actors do not only diverge on the interpretations of the policy objective but also disagree 
over prescription of which action should follow. Hence, the claim that having a shared 
understanding about the issue at hand is a precondition for cooperation. Without such 
common interpretation, practical cooperation can be significantly hampered. 
This argument appears to be highly relevant in respect of the European security and 
defence project. Cornish and Edwards (2005, 818) have noted that the fact that EU 
member states diverge on both their interpretations of the virtues of military force and on 
the appropriateness of the EU as a security actor poses a significant challenge to the 
development of the ESDP (now CSDP). Similarly, exploring the issue of under-
conceptualisation as it relates to the CSDP, Tardy (2018, 133) argues that it is precisely 
the fact that the member states do not have a common understanding of the term “defence” 
in the EU context that continues to hinder the development of an effective internal 
cooperation in this area. While some states see it mainly as a socialisation process through 
capacity development, others opt for a more proactive approach, setting the focus on 
conducting operations (Ibid.). Divergent interpretations of the ends and means of the same 
objective lead to a situation where the member states are simply pulling in different 
directions. Tardy specifically highlights the discussions on PESCO framework, and the 
contrast between the exclusive, mission-oriented vision put forward by France and the 
more inclusive approach of Germany in which socialisation of EU member states around 
joint projects was an end in itself (Ibid., 134). This exemplifies that, in the context of EU 
defence cooperation, the absence of clear meaning of the goal might render attempts at 
practical cooperation futile.  
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Yet, there is also an alternative approach that suggests that the notion of openness to 
interpretation (or under-conceptualisation) when defining collective strategic goals is not 
always incidental and also not necessary obstructive. On the opposite, the use of open 
language and blurry terms, such as “strategic autonomy”, can often be purposive in order 
to circumvent the issue of non-compliance. To further elaborate on this somewhat 
controversial idea, the concept of constructive ambiguity1 becomes useful. Defined as 
“the deliberate use of ambiguous language on a sensitive issue in order to advance some 
political purpose” (Berridge and James, 2003, cited from Rayroux, 2013, 387), this 
strategy can be, in fact, used to foster cooperation between social actors, including states. 
The logic behind this claim is that ambiguous concepts leave room for preferable national 
interpretations. This creates an illusion that the “offer on the table” is something that each 
individual actor wants, therefore creating more space for reaching agreements and 
engaging in cooperative action. However, it is important to be aware that the 
“constructive” element refers to the immediate advancement of a political goal, hence this 
strategy does not offer any guarantees on how the achieved cooperation will work out in 
the long term (Mitchell, 2009, 323). 
In the context of the EU, constructive ambiguity is mostly called upon in situations where 
national preferences are diverse and the EU’s legal basis not binding, good examples 
being defence and energy policies (Jegen and Mérand, 2013), or arms export control 
(Hansen, 2015). When it comes to the development of the CSDP, then Stanley Hoffmann 
(2000, 197) has noted that France and the UK giving different meanings to “autonomy” 
during the 1998 bilateral Saint-Malo actually helped to initiate the EU’s security and 
defence policy as such. The use of constructive ambiguity can also be exemplified by the 
lack of a clear strategic purpose in the so-called “Headline Goal”, varying national 
interpretations of the “Petersberg tasks”, and the content of the 2003 European Security 
Strategy (Rayroux, 2013, 388). It appears that loosely defined strategic objectives are 
anything but unusual in the context of EU security and defence cooperation. Linguistic 
ambiguity can often be the most effective tool in accommodating the diverse interests of 
the member states. As such, it also addresses the “Atlanticism vs. Europeanism” struggle 
                                                          
1 Authors working within a rationalist paradigm have examined a similar phenomenon under the notion of 
“incomplete contracting”. See e.g., Hofman, S. C. (2011). “Why Institutional Overlap Matters: CSDP in 
the European Security Architecture”, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 49 (1): 101–120. 
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that has proven to be one of the most fundamentally divisive aspects of the entire CSDP 
process. From this strand of literature which emphasises the potential of ambiguity to 
foster cooperation follows that unclear meaning does not only not hinder practical 
cooperation, but it may in fact facilitate it. 
Following the discussion on the two contrasting views on the relationship between 
ambiguity and cooperative action, this thesis argues that openness to interpretation, 
reflected in the sense that linguistic concepts that signify strategic objectives do not 
unequivocally have just one meaning, is neither good nor bad a priori with regard to 
practical cooperation. This means that the effect that the multiplicity of meanings at 
national level given to a linguistic concept at the international level has on cooperative 
action to pursue this objective is not pre-determined – it can be both, negative or positive. 
Whether the divergent interpretation across state actors culminate in obstacles to 
cooperation, or whether it forms the basis of finding shared organising principles for 
collective action depends on how this multiplicity is accommodated as the cooperation 
proceeds over time. In principle, there is always room for reaching a reasoned consensus 
among the state actors, be it by utility-maximising action, rule-guided behaviour, or 
engaging in argumentation and persuasion (see Risse, 2000; Wiener, 2014). Hence, 
multiple meanings given to a word, norm, idea, or a goal are not necessary something that 
need to be “governed away” by specification and reaching a common definition. In fact, 
this is often impossible or even counterproductive. Rather, the divergent interpretations 
can be expected to “even out” as the meaning of the concept is enacted in context-specific 
settings. 
Returning to the issue of defining the meaning of “strategic autonomy” at the EU level, 
this study suggests that even if the multiplicity of national interpretations of this term may 
appear problematic on a conceptual level, it may not be so for practical cooperation. On 
the one hand, there is a possibility that different visions about the essence of the goal of 
strategic autonomy and the method to be applied hinder the cooperation aimed to achieve 
this strategic objective. On the other hand, however, there is a chance that the ambiguity 
of this concept has made it easier for the member states to engage in the various initiatives 
that have been launched with hopes to enhance the EU’s capacity for autonomous action 
in security and defence affairs, therefore fostering cooperation instead. The latter option 
does not mean that there are no practical disagreements between the member states, but 
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it allows to suggest that it is possible to overcome them as the social interaction taking 
place within the various frameworks of cooperation feeds into the collective supply of 
interpretations. Whereas both options are theoretically possible in the case of EU strategic 


























The following section gives an overview of the methodological considerations of this 
study. First, it discusses the overall research strategy used in order to answer the proposed 
research questions: What are the meanings given to the term “strategic autonomy” by the 
EU member states? And second, how do the divergent understandings of “strategic 
autonomy” among the EU member states affect their practical cooperation to achieve this 
goal? In doing so, the aspects of case selection as well as the limitations of this study are 
discussed. Then, the Chapter proceeds by providing a more detailed insight into the 
matters related to data collection and conducting the expert interviews. Finally, the 
analytic procedure of integrating within-case and across-case analysis is summarised.  
  
2.1. Research Design 
 
The aim of this research paper is to explore the divergent understandings of the concept 
“strategic autonomy” among the EU member states and their effect on the practical 
cooperation to achieve this goal. As such, the research project is designed as a 
comparative study with an additional component focusing on the issue of cooperative 
action. More specifically, the first part of the analysis addresses the research puzzle by 
investigating the interpretations of the notion of strategic autonomy in five EU member 
states: France, the Netherlands, Germany, Finland, and Estonia. The result of this 
comparison serves as a reference point for the second half of the study, which takes a look 
at the member states’ perceptions about the implications of those multiple interpretations 
for cooperation, focusing on the case of PESCO. 
The comparison of the five different national interpretations of the idea of EU strategic 
autonomy is central to this study. The case selection builds upon the Atlanticist – 
Europeanist divide of strategic cultures (see Chapter 1.1.), which is used as an account 
for divergent understandings of strategic autonomy. This principle for case selection is 
used to structure the analysis and assure the optimal diversity of the possible meanings 
given to the concept of strategic autonomy. Rather than a binary differentiation between 
the two strategic cultures, the divide is viewed as a spectrum of inclinations in national 
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strategic cultures (Figure 1). Based on secondary literature, the most pronounced 
positions on the each end of the spectrum are identified (the Netherlands, France).2 In 
addition to the extreme positions, a “mid-way” case of Germany is added in order to 
substantiate the positions along the spectrum. Third, the aspect of neutrality will be 
separately taken into account, hence the case of Finland. Finally, the case of Estonia is 
included mainly from a local policy-relevant perspective, but it also exemplifies another 
Atlanticist state. While the case selection is based on states’ location on the Atlanticism 
– Europeanism spectrum, subsequently the sample is expanded to include variations 
across other divergences in EU member state strategic cultures, as defined by Howorth 
(2002, 90) –  allied/neutral, professional power projection/conscript-based territorial 
defence, nuclear/non-nuclear, military/civilian instruments, large/small states and 
weapon providers/consumers – to further depict the multiplicity of national 
understandings of “strategic autonomy” as they are shaped by diverse interpretive 
contexts. 
Besides seeking to map the divergent meanings given to the notion of strategic autonomy, 
the thesis also explores the practical implications of this multiplicity of understandings 
for the practical cooperation to achieve this strategic objective. In this part of the empirical 
research, the dynamics of cooperation within the PESCO framework will be analysed. 
The focus will be set on PESCO mainly for two reasons. First, described as “a driver for 
integration in the field of defence”, the EU itself considers PESCO to be a crucial 
mechanism to “reinforce the EU’s strategic autonomy” (European External Action 
Service, “PESCO”, n.d.). Second, with 25 member states participating, PESCO is 
currently the most inclusive platform for action aimed at incentivising EU internal 
cooperation in the field of security and defence. More specifically, the PESCO framework 
includes two components: legally binding commitments and projects. Binding 
commitments are pledges made by member states in the field of defence spending, 
capability development, and availability and interoperability of forces. Simultaneously, a 
number of cooperative projects (34 as of May 2019) have been launched by PESCO 
members, from training activities to cyber enablers (“About PESCO”, n.d.). Hence, 
                                                          
2 Traditionally the strong Atlanticist position would be associated with the United Kingdom, but due to 
their ongoing process of leaving the EU, this study excludes this case.  
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PESCO is found to be the most suitable case to study the drivers and pitfalls of 
cooperation aimed to support the goal of EU strategic autonomy. 
It is important to note that the second half of this study comes with two significant 
limitations. First, PESCO as well as all the other initiatives launched to support the EU’s 
ambition of becoming a more capable security and defence actor are still very new and in 
early stages of their implementation phase. Hence, it is difficult to draw any far-reaching 
conclusions regarding the eventual success of the cooperative action taking place within 
those formats. However, it is possible to say whether at this stage member states perceive 
the lack of a shared understanding of the set goals to be a substantive obstacle for their 
cooperation. Second, this study relies on expert interviews as means to collect empirical 
data. As such, the information gathered about the dynamics of cooperation and the 
obstacles that the member states have encountered within the PESCO framework reflects 
how those issues are assessed and interpreted by relevant decision-makers and policy 
experts from each of the five member states included in the research. Therefore, the 
findings cannot be treated as “hard facts”, but rather as initial insight into the effects of 
conceptual ambiguity on cooperative action.  
Taking those limitations into consideration, the analysis of the issue at hand remains 
largely exploratory. This means that this study does not aim to establish a strict causal 
relationship between the multiple understandings of strategic autonomy and the levels of 
cooperation among the member states within the key initiatives aimed to achieve this 
objective. Rather, it seeks to give indication whether the ambiguity surrounding the EU’s 
ambition of strategic autonomy poses any problems to the practical cooperation at all. 
And if so, then what are the most notable fault lines that have emerged from the divergent 
interpretations of this strategic goal and can now be seen to affect the process of putting 
it into practice.  
 
2.2. Data Collection 
 
In order to capture the national understandings of the notion of EU strategic autonomy, 
as articulated and distributed by relevant decision-makers, and the perceptions about the 
implications of those diverse interpretations for cooperation taking place within the 
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frameworks aimed to achieve this strategic objective, expert interviews were used as the 
main tool to collect up-to-date and comprehensive data. Cohen et al. (2007, 29) note that 
interviewing is “a valuable method for exploring the construction and negotiation of 
meanings in a natural setting”. In many ways, this is where the focus of this study lies. 
Being part of the process of generating the meanings given to “strategic autonomy”, 
government officials and policy experts are also expected to best communicate it to the 
outside. Similarly, interviewing decision-makers offers valuable insight into the arenas 
of practical cooperation. Furthermore, as the discussions and policy formation related to 
the objective of the strategic autonomy of the EU are still very much ongoing, the issue 
is not extensively covered neither by policy documents nor public statements.3 Hence, 
expert interviews allowed to uncover information that is not accessible elsewhere.  
In total, 23 interviews were conducted over the time period of February to March 2019. 
The distribution of the expert interviews across the five cases was the following: France 
– five; the Netherlands – four; Germany – five; Finland – five; Estonia – four. The 
principles of purposive sampling were followed as the aim was to find interviewees who 
are “information rich” (Drisko and Maschi, 2015, 98). The expertise on the topic was 
ascertained by the interviewees’ currently held professions. The target group consisted of 
officials from three key institutions: national Ministries of Defence (MoD), Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA), and Permanent Representations to the EU. Additionally, foreign 
and security policy experts from think tanks were included in the target group as they are 
often more accessible than high-level officials, but still carry sufficient expertise on the 
issue, being able to articulate the national understandings of strategic autonomy and the 
practical developments related to achieving this objective.   
The goal was to conduct at least 20 interviews. The target list of interviewees consisted 
of 30 names. It was not possible to schedule an interview with nine persons in the original 
target group. Two persons who declined the invitation to be interviewed gave suggestions 
as to people from similar backgrounds with whom the researcher was able to conduct the 
interviews. On all occasions, the reason for declining the invitation to participate in the 
                                                          
3 France is an exception here as the 2017 Review of Defence and National Security already included a 
separate section on building European strategic autonomy. Yet, even there the national viewpoint provided 
remains rather general. There have also been some joint declarations that briefly touch upon the concept, 
such as the 2018 Franco-Finnish statement on European defence. However, none of those documents allow 
to unfold the complex national understandings of the notion of strategic autonomy of the EU. 
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research project was lack of time. 19 interviews were conducted in English, while 
Estonian was used with four respondents. 16 interviews took place over the phone, five 
in person, and two via Skype. The average duration of the interviews was 45 minutes. 
The respondents were asked for their permission to record the interviews only for the use 
of the researcher. As a result, 22 of the 23 interviews were recorded. Audio recordings 
were destroyed after the interview had been transcribed. A list of the conducted interviews 
can be found in Appendix 1. 
A semi-structured interview format was chosen for the research as it is a good way to 
collect focused and readily comparable data, but it also leaves room for exploring new 
ideas as they may emerge from the interviews, allowing less restricted discussions on the 
issue. All the respondents were informed about the main issues to be discussed in the 
interview beforehand. Only when requested, the interviewees received a full list of 
preliminary interview questions prior conducting the interview. The interview questions 
were divided into two sections. The first set of questions focused on the national 
understandings of “strategic autonomy”, exploring the characteristics, perceptions, and 
practical issues associated with the concept. The second half of the interview questions 
investigated the effect that the multiplicity of meanings given to strategic autonomy has 
on practical cooperation to achieve this goal. Here, the focus was on the performance of 
PESCO as one the major steps taken towards the objective of strategic autonomy. The 
same list of questions was used for all the respondents. For the interviewees from Estonia, 
the original set of questions was translated from English to Estonian. The preliminary 
questions for the semi-structured interviews can be found in Appendix 2. 
Measures were taken to assure the transparency of the interview procedure and protect 
the confidentiality of research participants. The interviewees received a consent form with 
information about the research project and the interview procedure itself. This document 
explained the purpose of the study and all the technicalities concerning the interviews. It 
was ensured that all interviewees remained anonymous and their responses could not be 
linked to their identity. The interview consent form can be found in Appendix 3. 
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2.3. Integrating Within-Case and Across-Case Analytic Strategies 
 
The research puzzle of this study heavily relies on the necessity of understanding the 
individual cases in their own context, but also developing a synthesis that captures the 
variation across cases. Drawing on Ayres et al. (2003) and Yin (1994), an integrative 
strategy of within- and across-case analysis was utilised to enable the researcher to 
interpret the issue of divergent understandings of “strategic autonomy” both through its 
parts and as a whole, such that it would be possible to recognise individual accounts in a 
more generalizable way. Not being a one specific method, the strategies of integrating 
within- and across-case analysis are rather flexible and more often than not unique to a 
particular research project (Ayres et al., 2003, 882). Yet, the key element across all the 
different approaches is the identification of themes, or analytical categories, that provide 
the general structure for the research findings. Those key categories provide the 
foundations for case-specific descriptions as well as capture differences across the cases. 
Some themes may be concept-driven, i.e. based on previous knowledge, such as a theory, 
prior research, or an interview guide; others are developed during the analysis (Ayres et 
al., 2003, 880). 
The main analytical categories for this study were generated in a concept-driven way, 
based on the interview questions and theoretical underpinnings of the research project. 
For the section focusing on the divergent national understandings of “strategic autonomy” 
those were: (1) the defining elements of strategic autonomy; (2) exclusivity and 
inclusivity; (3) realisation of strategic autonomy; and (4) fit into the current regional 
security architecture. Whereas the guiding themes on the issues of practical cooperation 
within the PESCO framework were: (1) facilitating strategic autonomy; (2) ambiguity 
and cooperation; (3) fault lines. The identification of the main analytical categories was 
followed by an immersion in the collected data. First, all interviews were read to develop 
an overall understanding of how the notion of strategic autonomy and the efforts made to 
realise this goal are perceived among the policy experts and decision-makers from each 
of the five member states included in the study. In doing so, the data was also checked 
for any missing main analytical categories. None of those were identified. Then, the focus 
was set on each single country case. Within each case, significant statements were 
identified and organised by themes. The findings from all the interviews within one case 
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were compared to each other and general country-specific conclusions were drawn. 
Finally, the essential findings were compared across the five country cases. A general 
overview of the analytic strategy can be found in Table 1, whereas Table 2 explains more 
specifically the procedure of identifying and categorising significant statements within 
each country case. 
 
 
Table 1. Within- and Across-case Analytic Strategies Applied in the Study 
 
Strategy Analytic Focus Outcome 




Main analytical categories 
Analytic immersion in all 
interviews 
Within all cases Sense of the general 
understandings of the issue; 
checking for missing  
categories 
Immersion in each interview Within each case Identification of significant 
statements 
Organisation by themes Set of significant statements 
within each case 
Essential findings 
Comparison of the essential 
findings 
Across cases Identification of the main 
differences and similarities 
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Table 2. Identification and Categorisation of Significant Statements 
Analytical category Description 
MEANING OF STRATEGIC AUTONOMY 
The defining elements of strategic 
autonomy 
Statements that open up the essence of the 
notion of strategic autonomy. Includes 
references to its key components, e.g. 
operational capabilities, industrial base, 
shared mind-set/strategic thinking etc.  
Exclusivity and inclusivity Statements that either refer to strategic 
autonomy as a “European project” or discuss 
the role of strategic partnerships. Includes the 
issue of third party participation in the EU 
defence initiatives. 
Realisation of strategic autonomy Statements that discuss concrete steps that 
should be taken to fulfil the ambition of 
strategic autonomy. Includes references to 
specific capability gaps and current political 
shortcomings. 
Fit into the current regional security 
architecture 
Statements that discuss the relationship 
between the goal of strategic autonomy and 
NATO-centric security architecture. Focus is 
set on the issue of complementarity. 
PESCO AND COOPERATION 
Facilitating strategic autonomy Statements that assess the effectiveness of 
PESCO in contributing to the goal of 
strategic autonomy. Takes into consideration 
both, capability development and enhancing 
political integration. 
Ambiguity and cooperation Statements that indicate whether the plurality 
of understandings of the notion of strategic 
autonomy have had any practical 
implications for the cooperation among the 
member states.  
Fault lines Statements that refer to any practical issues 
and dividing points between the member 
states that have emerged during the 
implementation phase of PESCO. 
Differentiation is made between merely 
technical concerns and issues that result from 
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3. THE DIVERGENT UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE STRATEGIC 
AUTONOMY OF THE EU 
 
In the following this study proceeds with an analysis of French, Dutch, German, Finnish, 
and Estonian understandings of the notion of EU strategic autonomy. This is done by 
focusing on the following themes: the defining elements of strategic autonomy; the aspect 
of exclusivity and inclusivity; the best means of achieving this objective; and how 
strategic autonomy is seen to fit into the current regional security architecture. As such, 
the country-specific descriptions take into consideration some of the most practical 
questions linked to the strategic autonomy of the EU, from its essence to the realisation 
of this goal. Furthermore, the four core issue areas are expected to best capture the 
contrasts between the different interpretations of the concept among the EU member 
states across the Atlanticist – Europeanist divide in their national strategic cultures.  
 
3.1. France: Strategic Autonomy as a Political Principle 
 
What should “strategic autonomy” entail? 
Much of the French interpretation of the concept “strategic autonomy of the EU” starts 
from the acknowledgement that Europe as a whole needs to be more united in its strategic 
thinking. Something that all the government officials from France highlighted was that to 
be strategically autonomous means having a shared understanding of the surrounding 
security environment and developing common practices on how to operate in it. Ability 
to know, interpret, characterise and predict is considered to be the key for the EU to make 
decisions and act with autonomy. In many ways, the French policy-makers see a common 
European strategic culture as one of the prerequisites for European strategic autonomy 
(Interview 4FR; Interview 1FR). This approach to the notion of strategic autonomy is also 
reflected in the French-led European Intervention Initiative (EI2) – a joint project set up 
outside both the NATO and EU frameworks for enhancing military interactions between 
the most capable and willing European countries – that all the interviewees highlighted 
as one prime examples of the direction in which Europe should be moving in order to 
reinforce strategic autonomy. For France, therefore, strategic autonomy is a matter of a 
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mind-set that is not restricted to the developments taking place only inside of the EU 
structures. 
While ideational groundings of the EU strategic autonomy are important for Paris, at the 
heart of the French understanding of this strategic objective lies the notion of autonomy 
in action. As noted by one of the interviewees: "We really have this operational focus in 
our thinking of strategic autonomy. Without the actual ability to act independently and 
carry out operations everything else becomes much less meaningful." (Interview 1FR). 
The operational dimension of the EU strategic autonomy is discussed in rather concrete 
terms in Paris. That both in relation to occasions when the EU has to act independently 
out of necessity, but also when autonomous action serves the interests of Europe. Some 
examples that the interviewees brought up as scenarios in which the EU needs to be able 
to respond without assistance from NATO and the United States include: a terror attack 
against an EU member state, an attack against an EU member state that is not a member 
of NATO, and a hybrid conflict that may not fall under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty 
(Interview 1FR; Interview 3FR). Beyond this, the interviewees also found that it is crucial 
for the EU to enhance its capability to carry out missions promoting stability in its wider 
neighbourhood, expanding to peace enforcement if needed (Interview 4FR; Interview 
5FR). 
As indicated above, the level of ambition that France has regarding the operational 
capabilities of the EU are high. All the interviewees agreed that this autonomy also 
assumes the availability of those resources necessary to complement military 
engagements and facilitate disengagement. As one of the respondents noted “autonomy 
in action can really happen if you rely on the capabilities of others” (Interview 3FR). In 
this respect, there is a shared understanding in Paris that building a solid, coherent 
European industry is crucial for the strategic autonomy of the EU. However, the French 
are also aware of the complexity of this ambition. All the interviewees agreed that issues 
with demand management and harmonisation as well as dependencies on the US are 
difficult to ignore. One of the government officials further elaborated (Interview 5FR): 
We regard the preservation and development of the European defence-industrial 
base as critical to ensuring our ability to deliver defence; to be strategically 
autonomous. It may pose some challenges in the short-term. Like…let’s say the 
Americans’ willingness to cooperate. But in the long-term the European countries 
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will become more capable also as allies. Yes, it is important to do more in that 
area. And, yes, I believe that we are better allies when we have our own industrial 
base.  
Enhanced industrial independence is therefore integral part of the French interpretation 
of strategic autonomy. 
In conclusion, with regard to the defining elements of European strategic autonomy, the 
French understand the notion as the ability to act without depending on the capabilities 
of third parties. This independence in action is seen to rest equally on a common European 
strategic thinking (situational awareness) and appropriate material means (technology, 
equipment) to carry out operations. 
Exclusivity and inclusivity as it relates to the notion of strategic autonomy 
A clear message that came across from all the interviews was that favouring a culture of 
strong European unity in decision-making and action, and even more so increased self-
reliance, the French interpretation of strategic autonomy implies a notion of exclusivity. 
For the decision-makers in France, it seems to be a common sense that the steps that are 
taken in order to pursue the goal of the strategic autonomy of the EU must be European 
at least, as they most likely cannot always be strictly restricted to the EU members only. 
A good practical example to illustrate this mind-set is how the French approach the issue 
of third party participation in the EU defence initiatives. All the interviewees agreed that 
third party involvement should be exceptional as overt openness is simply seen to 
contradict the essence of strategic autonomy. As articulated by one of the government 
officials (Interview 5FR):  
In our view, any type of third party involvement in the EU initiatives should 
remain exceptional and remain regulated in very strict basis. It is all part of 
strategic autonomy. If you involve other states in the same way as the EU 
members…there is then just no point in having European strategic autonomy. It 
just…it just does not make sense. I mean, I am just formulating what I think is a 
common sense reflection.  
All the interviewees highlighted that the overall logic behind this more exclusive thinking 
is that European strategic autonomy as such revolves around the idea of lessening reliance 
on third countries. Therefore, the practical steps taken to achieve this goal should never 
recreate or add new dependencies. 
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Yet, the French policy-makers are aware that not all the member states are speaking the 
same language with them. The interviews clearly showed that there is a feeling in Paris 
that their approach guided by the principle of European preference is often misinterpreted 
by their partners in the EU as an attempt to achieve absolute autonomy (Interview 1FR; 
Interview 3FR; Interview 4FR). This, however, is not how the decision-makers in France 
themselves see it. Quite the opposite, all the interviewees univocally stressed that in 
Europe, partners are essential, both from the viewpoint of the EU as well as individual 
member states. As one of the French officials elaborated (Interview 4FR):  
The French know very well that the strategic autonomy as such goes only to a 
certain degree. And then...then there come areas where we simply are dependent 
on our partners. Of course, the US is the most important one here. The French do 
not overstretch strategic autonomy…not our national one, neither that of Europe. 
I believe that no one in Paris has the understanding that strategic autonomy can 
be absolute. The question here is the level of ambition that we have. We in Europe 
have to figure out where this ambition is. It is about doing more on our own, but 
not cutting ties with others.  
A concluding thought that emerged from the interviews was that much like the autonomy 
of a nation state, the strategic autonomy of the EU should be seen as a political principle 
in sense of being a sovereign and capable actor (Interview 1FR; Interview 5FR). The 
policy-makers further noted that this also means that when a national strategic autonomy 
is underpinned by national ownership of essential defence and security capabilities, then 
the strategic autonomy of the EU requires a European “ownership” of the developed 
capabilities (Interview 5FR). Yet, as mentioned above, the French understanding of 
“Europe being more, and doing more” (Interview 4FR) does by no means imply isolation 
or rejection of partnerships. 
The means of achieving strategic autonomy  
The French policy-makers have identified a wide range of steps necessary to put the idea 
of strategic autonomy in practice. In the long run, European strategic autonomy is seen to 
rest on a common doctrinal corpus, a credible joint military capacity as well as efficient 
shared budgetary means (Interview 1FR; Interview 4FR; Interview 5FR). All the 
interviewees noted that the gap between the wish for strategic autonomy and the reality 
of available resources is most significant in the context of military capabilities. Some of 
the shortcomings that the interviewees brought up as issue areas that need to be addressed 
   32 
 
include: high-end spectrum forces and sufficient enabling capabilities in areas such as 
intelligence and strategic reconnaissance, as well as interoperable and networked 
command and control systems (Interview 2FR; Interview 4FR; Interview 5FR). As all 
those improvements require notable financial resources, all the French policy makers 
stressed that increased defence spending is inevitable. In addition to the material means, 
all the interviewees also shared an understanding that fostering a common strategic 
thought is crucial for achieving strategic autonomy. In the French point of view, the steps 
that should be taken with this regard include strengthening situational awareness and 
further developing intelligence sharing practices both within and outside of the EU 
structures (Interview 1FR; Interview 3FR; Interview 4FR). 
All the interviewees noted that France also supports the optimal use of the new EU 
defence initiatives as means to foster strategic autonomy. As such, both PESCO and EDF 
are believed to be highly important tools to facilitate the development of capabilities that 
are the foundation of autonomous action in defence and security. However, a common 
thread that ran through the interviews was that those initiatives could be used at a higher 
level of ambition than now (Interview 4FR, Interview 5FR). More specifically, the 
interviewees noted that the projects launched within the PESCO framework should be 
more focused, and above all, address the operational needs of European armed forces 
(Interview 3FR; Interview 5FR). All in all, however, there is a shared understanding in 
Paris that the EU’s new “defence package” is a step in the right direction and the success 
of those initiatives in facilitating strategic autonomy is more a matter of political will than 
technicalities. Or, as put by one of the interviewees: "The mechanisms are there, but the 
Europeans need now to accept the need to pick up more responsibility. It is a question of 
stepping up our game." (Interview 4FR) 
But what about ideas, such as the European army? Much ambiguity still surrounds this 
ambition. While the interviews showed that the French clearly see developing a credible 
joint operational capability as an important step for achieving European strategic 
autonomy, it is not always seen as a “European army” in its strictest sense. Some decision-
makers perceive the notion of a European army more as a figurative presentation of the 
French ambitions regarding a united and capable Europe in the field of security and 
defence (Interview 1FR; Interview 5FR), for others this objective binds together a vision 
of strong and interoperable national forces (Interview 4FR). One of the French 
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government officials further noted: “We do not want to build strategic autonomy around 
things that are difficult, nearly impossible to reach. We don’t believe in the possibility of 
a European army as such. What we believe in is a stronger Europe in defence.” (Interview 
5FR). As such, it can be concluded that at least in this stage, the idea of a European army 
is there for the French to inspire, rather than to be an actual tool towards strategic 
autonomy. 
To summarise, with regard to means of achieving strategic autonomy, the French stress 
three key elements: ensuring adequate financial resources to deliver on defence, meaning 
increased defence spending; addressing capability gaps and therefore also making the best 
use out of the new EU defence initiatives; and fostering a common European strategic 
thought by developing intelligence sharing practices.  
Fit into the current regional security architecture 
A clear message that came across all the interviews was that, in the viewpoint of France, 
strategic autonomy of the EU in no sense means competition with NATO and that no 
parallel structures are to be created. Instead, the interviewees univocally stressed, 
transatlantic relations will become more robust in the long term, as the Europeans assume 
greater financial and operational responsibility for their own security. However, the 
policy-makers in Paris also noted that this increased responsibility must not be understood 
not so much as a response to American demands of fairer burden sharing, but more as an 
action made indispensable by the changed strategic environment in which Europe finds 
itself today (Interview 4FR; Interview 5FR). In more practical terms, all the interviewees 
highlighted that the developed capabilities that lie at the heart of European strategic 
autonomy will benefit both the EU and NATO. As summarised by one of the interview 
respondents: “This fear of competition or duplication between European strategic 
autonomy and the transatlantic alliance is much more conceptual than present in practice. 
It is mostly a matter of good planning. In fact, the two are complementary if anything.” 
(Interview 3FR).  
While France does not question the importance of NATO in the regional security 
architecture, there is also no denial in the fact that transatlantic breaches play a role in the 
need for the strategic autonomy of the EU. When it comes to Europe and the US 
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specifically, all the interviewees noted that there is a growing feeling in Paris that the two 
sides do not see eye to eye on the politics of international security. As expressed by one 
of the interviewees: “Europe is not moving away from the US. That is the US that is 
moving away from us. And this means that we have to be more self-sufficient. We do not 
want to the US to disengage. Not at all. But we cannot just hope that they won’t.” 
(Interview 4FR). This shift is seen more as a result of long-term structural changes in the 
US foreign policy (i.e. an increased focus on China) than simply a reflection of the current 
Administration (Interview 4FR; Interview 5FR). As such, in France, the quest for 
European strategic autonomy is considered to not only be politically legitimate but in 
many ways inevitable response to the changed strategic environment.  
In conclusion, from the perspective of France, the notion of European strategic autonomy 
does not contradict with the current regional security architecture. In the French 
understanding, Europe doing more for its defence should not be seen as something to 
challenge NATO or the US. Rather, this increased European drive in defence should be 
seen as a reflection of the increasingly complex security landscape where taking more 
responsibility for your own needs is a must rather than a choice. 
Summary: The French understanding of strategic autonomy 
From the viewpoint of France, a member state with strong Europeanist inclinations in its 
strategic culture, the strategic autonomy of the EU should be seen as a political principle 
in sense of being a sovereign and capable actor in the field of security and defence. This 
means that Europe must be able to decide and act in its best interests without depending 
on the capabilities of third parties. This independence in action is seen to rest equally on 
a common European strategic thinking and appropriate defence capabilities, both of 
which are currently facing significant shortcomings that need to be addressed. While the 
French policy-makers acknowledge that strategic autonomy is always relative, the main 
aim of this objective should always be lessening dependencies. Hence, from the French 
viewpoint, the practical steps taken towards strategic autonomy (e.g. collaborative 
capability development) should first and foremost be about Europeans doing more 
together and not rely on the input of third parties. In the French interpretation, there is no 
contradiction between the strategic autonomy of the EU and a strong transatlantic 
alliance. The fears of decoupling and duplication are considered to be more conceptual 
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than practical. If anything, the need for a more autonomous Europe in defence is seen to 
be a reflection of the changed strategic environment in which the divide between the US 
and Europe has increased, not vice versa. 
 
3.2. The Netherlands: Strategic Autonomy as “Better”, Not “More” Europe 
 
What should “strategic autonomy” entail? 
The concept “strategic autonomy” is approached with caution in the Netherlands. All the 
interviewees noted that the reference to “autonomy” is considered to be an unfortunate 
choice of words and the Dutch policy-makers would rather follow the proposition made 
by Finland to talk about “strategic responsibility” instead (see also Chapter 3.4). 
However, going beyond the words themselves, the Dutch understand “strategic 
autonomy” mainly as a capabilities-driven concept that refers to Europe’s ability to act in 
its best interests, but also allows for greater burden-sharing between Europe and the 
United States. This message came across all the interviews. The Dutch policy-makers 
further noted that European strategic autonomy is in many ways also about good judgment 
and pragmatism – it is important not only to be able to act, but to act wisely (Interview 
1NL; Interview 3NL). This also means that maintaining strong strategic partnerships goes 
hand in hand with strategic autonomy (Interview 3NL; Interview 4NL). All the 
interviewees had a common understanding that from the viewpoint of the Netherlands, 
strategic autonomy as such should primarily be defined along the lines of improving 
European defence posture rather than seeking autonomy in the sense of greater 
independence.  
Several interviewees themselves noted that in The Hague, the debate on the strategic 
autonomy of the EU is considered to be a politically delicate issue that should be handled 
without making any promises that are impossible to fulfil or that simply do not serve the 
interests of the member states (Interview 2NL; Interview 3NL; Interview 4NL). One 
Dutch official further elaborated: “For us having a discussion on what do different 
elements of strategic autonomy mean is already very important. In a way it is a case of 
the journey being more important than the destination.” (Interview 4NL). Hence, it can 
be said that the Dutch vision of the defining elements of this concept is still in the making. 
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Nevertheless, in their overall thinking, the policy experts in the Netherlands have also 
adopted the three widely recognised dimensions of strategic autonomy, these being the 
political, operational, and industrial autonomy. Along the lines of political decision-
making, all the interviewees noted that, from the Dutch point of view, the EU does not 
have any big issues with autonomy. Therefore, European autonomy is already considered 
to be present in this area. The elements of autonomy in action and autonomy in defence-
industrial matters, however, could be improved (Interview 1NL; Interview 2NL; 
Interview 3 NL). 
While all the interviewees agreed that ability to act as Europeans is an integral part of 
strategic autonomy, there is also a shared understanding in the Netherlands that the notion 
of strategic autonomy should not entail the EU changing its operational profile. From the 
Dutch perspective, matters related to collective defence shall always remain in the realm 
of NATO (Interview 1NL, Interview 3NL). Similarly, all the interviewees noted that 
engagement in large-scale peace enforcement operations is not believed to be something 
that the EU could achieve in the mid-term, if ever. As one of the interviewees elaborated: 
“For us, European strategic autonomy does not mean self-sufficiency in operational 
matters. It is unrealistic. Rather we should be thinking about bettering our game.” 
(Interview 2NL). While the Dutch political elites are pragmatic with regard to the 
operational ambitions that the strategic autonomy of the EU should encompass, all the 
interviewees confirmed that a stronger European defence-industrial base is something 
that cannot be overlooked in relation to strategic autonomy, as “it is difficult to talk about 
being stronger in action if you yourself do not have the means to act upon” (Interview 
3NL). However, the Dutch policy-maker prefer to not delve too deep into this topic, as 
the general message that came across the interviews was once again that Europe should 
remain pragmatic in its ambitions (Interview 2NL, Interview 3NL). 
To conclude, from the viewpoint of the Netherlands, the notion of strategic autonomy is 
considered to be mainly about being better Europe, not more Europe. It refers to the 
gradual process of defence capability development that would allow the EU to be a more 
reliable security actor and also a stronger strategic partner. For the Dutch policy-makers, 
“strategic autonomy” is about improvement not self-reliance. 
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Exclusivity and inclusivity as it relates to the notion of strategic autonomy 
The sense of exclusivity that the concept “strategic autonomy” is seen to carry is one of 
the main concerns for the Netherlands. All the interviewees stressed that security issues 
that Europe faces today require an inclusive approach, full stop. In the Dutch 
understanding, this means working together with different strategic partners across 
different cooperation formats (Interview 3NL, Interview 4NL). From the perspective of 
the Netherlands, “strategic autonomy” should therefore never imply exclusivity. On the 
opposite, the ambition of a more capable EU in security and defence affairs can only 
happen in cooperation with other strategic players. A similar thought was put forward in 
all the interviews (Interview 4NL): 
For us, for the Netherlands, being able to act as the European Union in our view 
always happens in close cooperation with our partners outside of the European 
Union. I think that this is an important…maybe sometimes a bit of a distinction 
compared to how the concept of strategic autonomy is being discussed in some 
other member states. It is about being able to work together with NATO, but also 
bilaterally or multilaterally with other partners outside of the EU. Our idea is that 
for Europe to be stronger, or more autonomous along those lines, working together 
with other countries also benefits the EU cooperation internally.  
On a more practical level, this strong belief in inclusivity results in a liberal approach to 
opening up EU defence initiatives to third parties. All the interviewees noted that the 
Netherlands has been vocal about this issue within the EU and firmly stands its ground. 
The Dutch policy-makers see no contradiction in the notion of strategic autonomy and 
cooperating with partners from outside of the EU. Rather, the third parties are believed to 
bring added value by offering resources that the EU or its member states themselves are 
lacking of (Interview 3NL, Interview 4NL).  Hence, there is a shared understanding in 
The Hague, that the regulations on third party involvement in the EU frameworks should 
be limited. This was something that all the interviewees were very clear about.  
To summarise, “openness” remains a key word in the Dutch definition of strategic 
autonomy, even if it sounds somewhat contradictory. From the viewpoint of the 
Netherlands, the notion of a more capable Europe in security and defence can only happen 
together with partners and allies.  
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The means of achieving strategic autonomy 
Achieving strategic autonomy of the EU, or preferably picking up greater strategic 
responsibility is seen as a gradual process in The Hague. All the interviewees indicated 
that the Dutch support a more conservative approach in fostering strategic autonomy that 
seeks to update the existing CSDP by crafting modest improvements and fine-tuning the 
initiatives that have already put in place. Another more specific element that was stressed 
by all the Dutch government officials was that the Netherlands firmly believes in making 
the best use out of the wide toolbox of instruments that the EU has, including different 
diplomatic measures, as means of enhancing strategic autonomy. From the Dutch point 
of view, strategic autonomy should therefore “rely on the strengths of the EU, not seek to 
redefine its nature” (Interview 1NL). The general understanding in the Netherlands is that 
in the current stage of the EU ambitions it is the process of developing compatible 
approaches regarding the nature and focus of the various EU defence initiatives that must 
be the priority (Interview 4NL): 
This topic of strategic autonomy and all the defence initiatives that the EU as 
implemented, all of them are still very new even for the EU member states and 
the Union itself. (…) We are still building on these different building blocks and 
trying to figure out exactly what it is. I like to compare it to a scenario where we 
are building a house, it is not quite done yet – there is a roof, but a lot of things 
are still missing. But we are already living in it.  
While the Dutch policy-makers may not have defined a “grand strategy” how to realise 
the goal of strategic autonomy, there are some key areas that are considered to be crucial 
in developing European defence capabilities that serve this objective. First and foremost, 
all the interviewees pointed out the need for European states to substantially and durably 
increase their defence spending. This is considered to be important not only with regard 
to the ambition of strategic autonomy, but a wider range of defence commitments that 
Europe has (Interview 2NL; Interview 3NL). Second, several interviewees noted that the 
EU must continuously prioritise investments in defence-industrial research and 
development as well as procurement. The new EU initiatives, such as EDF, are highly 
relevant in this regard (Interview 1NL; Interview 3NL; Interview 4NL). PESCO is also 
considered to be an important tool for European capability development as it allows to 
target some of the most immediate shortcomings in a cooperative way. An area that is 
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definitely a priority for the Netherlands in this regard is military mobility (Interview 2NL; 
Interview 3NL).  Finally, some of the Dutch government officials specifically referred to 
boosting resilience and protecting critical infrastructure both inside and outside of the EU 
borders as a key to ensuring Europe’s ability to be a capable defence actor (Interview 
1NL; Interview 2NL). 
While the Dutch political elites support the prospect of a consistent development of 
Europe’s civilian and military capabilities as means of achieving strategic autonomy, 
overly courageous visions are not something that are dealt with in The Hague. Some ideas 
that have emerged from the debates surrounding the concept, such as the “European 
army”, are viewed in a rather negative light in the Netherlands. None of the interviewees 
believed in the benefit of this type of means. As stressed by one of the Dutch officials: 
“A European army as such, and I know that it has been also described by much longer 
phrasing, is something in which we don’t believe in. So, we don’t even have to start 
thinking about how would you do something like that. It is not seen as feasible or even 
possible here in the Netherlands.” (Interview 2NL). All in all, there was a shared 
understanding among the interviewees that the goal of strategic autonomy must rely on 
realistic means. 
To conclude, with regard to means of achieving strategic autonomy, the Dutch policy-
makers highlight the need to identify European vulnerabilities and capability gaps and 
find the best solutions to address them across the different institutional and multilateral 
formats of cooperation. For the Netherlands, it is the process of gradual capability 
development that matters more than strategic autonomy as an end in itself. 
Fit into the current regional security architecture 
Something that all the interviewees stressed was that for the Netherlands, it is extremely 
important that the strategic autonomy of the EU does not come at the expense of NATO 
and a strong transatlantic relationship. As noted by one of the Dutch officials: “The vision 
of a very Europeanised regional defence as such, this is something that we do not see. 
Mainly because it would most likely result in diminishing the centrality of NATO, which 
we strongly believe in.” (Interview 2NL). From the viewpoint of the Netherlands, it is 
clear that the notion of “autonomy” as such may trigger alarm on both sides of the Atlantic 
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(Interview 1NL; Interview 3NL). Hence, it is considered to be crucial to have a clear 
common message to the US and NATO as a whole about the EU’s efforts of becoming a 
more reliable actor, and therefore also a stronger partner, in the field of security and 
defence. All the interviewees also noted that in light of the EU’s higher level of ambition 
in defence related matters it is critical to avoid any type of duplication or impractical use 
of resources.  
At the same time, the Dutch policy-makers also acknowledge that the strategic interests 
of the EU and the US may not always be the same. Something that all the interviewees 
pointed out is that being a strategically responsible rather than an autonomous actor does 
not mean that the transatlantic allies must undertake all operational activities under the 
same flag. It has never been the case. However, there is an agreement in The Hague that 
EU and NATO initiatives, as well as bilateral, multilateral and regional ones should 
always be envisaged as parts of one coherent project (Interview 3NL; Interview 4NL). 
The Dutch firmly believe that the principle of complementarity is not only a key of 
achieving strategic autonomy, but the goal of strategic autonomy should be pursued in a 
way that it would further improve the aspect of complementarity (Interview 1NL): 
NATO really is the cornerstone of our defence policy and it remains this. We also 
see that in terms of complementarity and in terms of cooperation between NATO 
and the EU there is still quite a lot that could be improved. There are things that 
NATO is traditionally very good at. There are also instruments and measures that 
are only available for the EU. For example, if it comes to resilience building, the 
EU is most definitely a more capable actor to carry out this type of task. The idea 
of strategic autonomy, we think that it should foster this goal of better 
complementarity.  
To summarise, from the Dutch perspective, the objective of European strategic autonomy 
does not contradict the current regional security architecture only when it is handled with 
care. There must be a conscious effort made to ensure that no transatlantic breaches will 
be created while pursuing increased European defence and security integration. Self-
sufficiency and simply stronger EU in security and defence are not the same, and it is the 
latter that the Netherlands is opting for. 
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Summary: The Dutch understanding of strategic autonomy 
For the Netherlands, notably the Atlanticist counterpart, achieving strategic autonomy, 
whether it be at the EU level or in Europe as a whole, is not defined by the finality of this 
project. From the viewpoint of the Netherlands, strategic autonomy should be defined 
along the lines of improving European defence posture not as much as seeking autonomy 
in the sense of self-sufficiency. In the Dutch understanding, the notion of a more capable 
Europe in security and defence can only happen together with partners and allies. 
Becoming strategically autonomous is considered to be a matter of adapting to the current 
strategic environment and addressing the capability gaps by making the best use out of 
all the diverse formats of defence cooperation that are available, rather than crafting a 
new defence identity for the EU. From the viewpoint of the Netherlands it is indeed 
possible to pursue the goal of strategic autonomy in the way that it would complement 
the transatlantic alliance, however, a conscious effort must be made by the Europeans to 
stay clear in their messages and realistic in their ambitions in order not to create any 
breaches with our key strategic partners. 
 
3.3. Germany: The “Both/And” Approach to Strategic Autonomy 
 
What should “strategic autonomy” entail? 
The German interpretation of the concept of strategic autonomy lies somewhere in 
between high ambitions and pragmatic cautiousness. On the one hand, there interviewees 
highlighted that European defence must gain in political significance and strategic 
autonomy goes hand in hand with that (Interview 3DE; Interview 4DE). Efficiency, 
coherence and credibility of Europe in the military field are considered to be increasingly 
important. This idea also fits into the German desire for multilateralism and enhanced 
European integration (Interview 5DE). On the other hand, however, Germany remains 
careful in its words. Several interviewees stressed that the notion of responsibility remains 
the key driving force behind Germany’s approach to European security and defence 
affairs (Interview 1DE; Interview 2DE). Hence, the strategic autonomy of the EU is still 
not framed as a “strategic objective”, but rather as a commitment that should serve the 
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interests of Europe itself, but also benefit its partners (Interview 2DE; Interview 4DE). 
Therefore, from the viewpoint of Germany, the development of European civilian and 
military is believed to strengthen Europe not only internally but also externally. 
While the idea of a stronger and more capable Europe in defence is supported by 
Germany, the concept “strategic autonomy” itself is still met with indecisiveness. As 
further elaborated by one of the interviewees: “The term “strategic autonomy” is very 
new in Germany. It has never been featured in strategic documents. It really is something 
that is not very common to Germans.” (Interview 5DE). “How to go far enough without 
going too far?” appears to be one of the key questions that Germany itself still seeks to 
answer when defining the essence of the strategic autonomy of the EU. At times, it seems 
that Germany’s ambition to redefine European defence is as high as it gets, as several 
interviewees underpinned the notion of strategic autonomy with references to the “Army 
of the Europeans”, meaning better coordinated and mutually reinforcing national armies, 
or “European Defence Union” that put the emphasis on operational capability (Interview 
3DE; Interview 4DE). From a more practical perspective, however, the German 
understanding of “strategic autonomy” is simply about European unitedness in action in 
the field of  foreign and security policy, both together with its partners and alone when 
necessary (Interview 1DE; Interview 2DE; Interview 5DE).  
What stands out in the German approach to strategic autonomy is its highly 
institutionalised nature. The EU – from the German perspective – clearly is the most 
important framework for the strategic autonomy of Europe (Interview 1DE; Interview 
2DE; Interview 5DE). All the interviewees agreed that the EU specifically offers a stable, 
permanent structures for cooperation and capability development that are considered to 
be essential preconditions for strategic autonomy. Technically speaking, Germany also 
believes that an enhanced defence-industrial dimension of Europe is a relevant part of 
strategic autonomy, but there is also a clear understanding that it is a controversial issue 
where certain dependencies are simply there to stay (Interview 2DE, Interview 3DE; 
Interview 5DE). So, once again, the focus for Germany is not on aiming for self-
sufficiency, but rather more united Europe in the field of security and defence. In many 
ways, the Germans consider the mere existence of the CSDP as a sign that there already 
is a degree of autonomy in European defence (Interview 3DE; Interview 4DE).  
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To conclude, for Germany, being a strategically autonomous Europe means having the 
appropriate structural foundation and capabilities, both civilian and military, to act 
together as Europe in the field of security and defence. Being framed as a matter of 
responsibility, this enhanced capacity is believed to be a commitment made to Europe 
itself as well as to its partners. 
Exclusivity and inclusivity as it relates to the notion of strategic autonomy 
From the German perspective, the strategic autonomy of the EU clearly is a “European 
project”, so to speak. All the interviewees highlighted that the notion of strategic 
autonomy rests on the idea of strengthening the European Union and fostering integration. 
With this focus on European unitedness, the German policy-makers believe that the steps 
taken to enhance security and defence cooperation have to be as inclusive as possible 
inside of the EU (Interview 1DE; Interview 4DE; Interview 5DE). Meaning, getting all 
the member states around the same table is considered to be crucial part of fostering 
strategic autonomy (Interview 3DE; Interview 5DE). As such, the German thinking stays 
in line with the approach successfully pressed for with the inclusive PESCO format. One 
of the interviewees further elaborated: “We cannot think individually. We have to think 
over the borders. And only if we work together as the European Union, then we can stand 
as one voice in this increasingly challenging strategic environment. We need to be more 
united than ever.” (Interview 4DE). 
However, when it comes to the wider picture of European defence, then Germany most 
definitely wants to avoid exclusivity, or even more so, isolation. All the interviewees 
stressed that being strategically autonomous and working together with important 
strategic partners should never become “this or that” question. In practice, however, 
finding an appropriate appears to be somewhat difficult for Germany. This, mostly in the 
context of the different EU defence initiatives. When it comes to the principles of third 
party participation in the EU initiatives, the decision-makers in Germany remain 
internally divided. The interviews revealed that there are different opinions among the 
policy-makers. One of the two dominant narratives suggests that there has to be a clear 
differentiation between the EU member states and non-members (Interview 1DE; 
Interview 4DE). The main fear here is that giving third parties something that should be 
reserved to the members will eventually weaken the EU, hence also its autonomy. The 
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other narrative, however, argues that if one really wants to strengthen the EU as a defence 
actor, there has to be room for third party participation, otherwise the cooperation will 
simply happen outside of the EU framework (Interview 3DE; Interview 5DE). Of course, 
post-Brexit UK remains one of the key issues in those debates (Interview 5DE). All in 
all, however, it seems that Germany as a whole is moving towards adopting a more 
pragmatic position on this question (Interview 2DE): 
It is very important that within PESCO, third-party states that we want to keep at 
our side have the ability to participate in projects in a clearly regulated, yet not 
overly complicated way. Those countries bring in knowledge, methods, and new 
ways of thinking. Therefore we are open in our approach. At the same time, there 
are definitely some projects in which your goal is to gain some level of 
independence. Then one would look very carefully what partners, if any, to 
involve. Most likely this issue requires some decisions to be made simply on case 
by case basis. It is a delicate balance.  
To summarise, the quest for strategic autonomy and the wider European integration 
process go hand in hand in Berlin. As such, from the German perspective, the strategic 
autonomy of the EU is about bringing Europe together without building any walls around 
it. 
The means of achieving strategic autonomy 
While the support for increased EU defence capacity is definitely there, the debate on 
practical action to be taken in order to foster strategic autonomy seems to go around in 
circles in Germany. While pressing for integration and more political coherence, 
Germany displays little ambition to actively shape the military dimension of the CSDP. 
Instead, much of the German focus is set on various institutional challenges. All the 
interviewees highlighted that the EU’s institutional framework in its current form no 
longer accommodates all of the Union’s needs, especially when it comes to Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). From the viewpoint of Germany, the ambition of 
strategic autonomy cannot be achieved without overcoming these type of institutional 
shortfalls (Interview 1DE; Interview 5DE). One of the proposals that several interviewees 
highlighted is taking decisions by majority voting rather than unanimously in 
CFSP/CSDP that is believed to improve the EU’s capability to respond rapidly and 
credibly to external developments (Interview 1DE; Interview 3DE; Interview 4DE).  
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In Germany, there is a shared understanding that strategic autonomy should not rest only 
on military capabilities and vertical defence integration. All the interviewees noted that 
achieving the objective of strategic autonomy also depends on deeper horizontal 
integration of various domains of European power, ranging from diplomacy and 
economic policy, to humanitarian aid and internal security policy. As one of the German 
officials noted: “The EU should embrace its uniqueness and not try to fit into the “military 
shoes” of NATO. Becoming strategically autonomous is not only a matter of hard 
defence.” (Interview 4DE). That, however, does not mean that Germany does not consider 
EU military capability development as an important step towards strategic autonomy. On 
the opposite, all the interviewees stressed that the capability to act is always dependent 
on material means. As such, all the interviewees also noted that the new European 
initiatives, such as EDF and PESCO are highly welcomed. The latter one in particular is 
seen as a huge success story in Berlin that could potentially not only address capability 
gaps but foster political cohesion in the CSPD, both of which are important with regard 
to fostering strategic autonomy (Interview 1DE; Interview 5DE). 
The interviewees also noted that achieving strategic autonomy also requires a deeper 
European integration in the area of defence industry. Working more closely together when 
it comes to developing, procuring and operating military-technological systems is seen as 
an important step in securing a more capable Europe in the field of security and defence 
(Interview 2DE; Interview 3DE; Interview 5DE). However, the Germans find it difficult 
to ignore the distinctive character and specificity of the defence market and the 
dependencies on the US (Interview 3DE; Interview 5DE). Hence, the aspect of 
strengthening the European defence-industrial base as a step towards strategic autonomy 
is still discussed in a relatively generic matter in Germany. All the interviewees shared an 
opinion that initiatives, such as EDF are very much needed for Europe to become a more 
effective and autonomous defence actor, but no one in Germany wants to make any 
promises on the level of ambition that the EU should have in the field of defence industry. 
In conclusion, it can be said that from the German perspective, the most important steps 
towards European strategic autonomy include addressing the institutional shortcomings 
of the CSDP, fostering European integration not only in the field of defence but also in 
the domains of soft power, and focusing on capability development while making the best 
use out of the new EU defence initiatives. As such, the German focus is very much on 
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integrative matters, or as noted by one of the German officials: “If we have the political 
will, the rest will follow.” (Interview 2DE). 
Fit into the current regional security architecture 
For Germany, European strategic autonomy is not something that seeks to reshape the 
current regional security architecture. All the interviewees stressed that within its 
preferred multilateral context, NATO remains the key institution for European defence 
policy. The Germans believe that moves towards more autonomous EU in the field of 
security and defence should not be discussed in the context of “for or from the United 
States” (Interview 3DE), but rather as a response to the changed strategic environment 
and Europe’s own needs. Yet, a message that came across from all the interviews was 
that if done well, then the EU’s growing defence capabilities could result in a transatlantic 
dynamic based on cooperation rather than dependence. The decision-makers in Berlin 
believe that this would be greeted as a positive development on both sides of the Atlantic. 
This argument also refers to the so-called “comprehensive approach” to security and 
defence operations, ensuring the harmonisation and complementarity of the EU and 
NATO frameworks, that several interviewees pointed out as the direction in which 
European defence as a whole should move (Interview 2DE; Interview 4DE). As such, 
from the perspective of Germany, the notion of European strategic autonomy does not 
really challenge the transatlantic relationship.  
However, much like the French, the Germans also believe that there is an increasing gap 
between the strategic interests of Europe and the US, much of it being influenced by the 
“Trump-factor” (Interview 1DE; Interview 3DE; Interview 5DE) Hence, strategic 
autonomy is in many ways considered to be “a necessity” (Interview 1DE). One the 
German government officials further noted: “There is a need for Europe to become 
strategically more capable, but not in a way that this is something that is building a wall 
in between the transatlantic alliance, or between the Americans and Europeans. But we 
really have to decide where do we want to be able to act as Europeans if nobody else has 
an interest in acting.” (Interview 3DE). As already indicated above, this uncertainty 
towards the US does not mean that Germany questions NATO’s centrality to the 
European security architecture. Rather, the Germans policy-makers believe that the 
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security environment in which Europe finds itself has changed, and strategic autonomy is 
a reflection of European countries needing to adapt (Interview 3DE; Interview 4DE). 
To conclude, there are two very similar narratives that best summarise the German 
thinking on how the European quest to strategic autonomy relates to the regional security 
architecture: “becoming more European while remaining transatlantic” (Interview 5DE), 
or “thinking European and planning transatlantic” (Interview 4DE). This means that for 
Germany, an increased European drive in defence remains always complementary to 
NATO. 
Summary: The German understanding of strategic autonomy 
For Germany, being a strategically autonomous Europe means having the appropriate 
structural foundation and capabilities, both civilian and military, to be a reliable actor in 
the field of security and defence. As such, it is considered to be a principle that serves the 
interests of Europe but also benefits its partners. From the German perspective, the 
ambition for strategic autonomy and wider European integration are deeply interlinked. 
Enhanced defence cooperation is considered to be the key for achieving strategic 
autonomy and, at the same time, the mere ambition of strategic autonomy itself is believed 
to bring Europeans closer together. Along those lines, the most important steps towards 
European strategic autonomy, from Germany’s point of view, include addressing the 
institutional shortcomings of the CSDP, fostering European integration not only in the 
field of defence but also in the domains of soft power, and capability development while 
making the best use out of the new EU defence initiatives. Despite the German focus on 
strategic autonomy as a “European project”, it is not something that is meant to challenge 
the transatlantic partnership. Rather, Germany sees a stronger Europe in defence and a 
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3.4. Finland: Calling for Strategic Responsibility Instead 
  
What should “strategic autonomy” entail? 
In Finland, the notion of strategic autonomy is perceived in a rather uncomplicated 
manner as a capacity to act independently when the circumstances demand so (Interview 
1FI; Interview 2FI, Interview 4FI). From the Finnish perspective, this capacity is seen to 
rely on both, material means (i.e. equipment and finances) and solidarity between the 
member states. Or as summarised by one of the interviewees (Interview 4FI):   
Our understanding in Finland is that “strategic autonomy” means, or should mean, 
that in the long term the EU should be capable of dealing with emerging crisis and 
problems in its wider neighbourhood and within its borders by European means if 
necessary. A schoolbook type of example of this would be what happened in 
Libya in 2011. And in that case Europe really lacked this capacity. We lacked the 
means and the willingness. 
For Finland, therefore, European strategic autonomy remains mainly a capability-driven 
and action-oriented goal.  
In Finland, the term “strategic autonomy” as such, however, is not seen as the best fit to 
describe the direction in which European defence should move, as all the interviewees 
noted that they would prefer to talk about “strategic responsibility” instead. From the 
viewpoint of Finland, this notion better “captures the complex reality of today’s strategic 
environment” (Interview 3FI). More specifically, this means a responsibility to protect 
European interests, responsibility to promote peace and stability not only within but also 
outside of its borders, and a responsibility to be a reliable strategic partner (Interview 2FI; 
Interview 3FI; Interview 4FI). Yet, the Finnish policy-makers also believe that as the 
concept is already there, it is not wise to get stuck in the wording, but rather focus on 
what this means in terms of practice (Interview 1FI; Interview 5FI). From the viewpoint 
of Finland, the new EU defence initiatives is a good indication of that (Interview 1FI).  
Even if the Finnish policy experts and practitioners differentiate between strategic 
autonomy and responsibility, their thinking of the concept still revolves around the three 
key dimensions of autonomy in decision, autonomy in action, and a better secured 
European defence-industrial base (Interview 1FI, Interview 3FI, Interview 4FI). 
However, rather than aiming for independence in those areas, from Finland’s point of 
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view, the focus for Europe should be on improvement. This was something that all the 
interviewees stressed. The Finnish also believe that the strategic autonomy of Europe 
goes beyond that of the EU. The interviewees univocally found that there should be a 
synergy between all the different institutional, multilateral, and bilateral cooperation 
formats that eventually serve Europe’s security and defence interests. As such, the 
strategic autonomy is always seen to be relative, whether one talks about the ability to 
carry out operations or European defence-industrial base. Several interviewees noted that 
there are only so many areas in which Europeans could even think about self-sufficiency, 
hence from the Finnish perspective, “strategic autonomy is more about smart thinking 
and credibility” (Interview 4FI).  
To conclude, the Finnish policy-makers define European strategic autonomy in terms of 
Europe’s capacity to act (more) independently to serve its interests, particularly in terms 
of defence and security, but also to be a reliable partner. From the viewpoint of Finland, 
the notion remains always relative and should not refer to self-sufficiency in its strictest 
sense, but rather capture improvement and enhanced credibility. 
Exclusivity and inclusivity as it relates to the notion of strategic autonomy 
All the interviewees highlighted that from the Finnish viewpoint, the EU’s quest for 
strategic autonomy should not by any means imply exclusivity. The Finnish political 
community believes that this is also something that must be clearly communicated to the 
outside, to Europe’s strategic partners: “We are very much calling for positive messaging 
here that does not exclude anyone, but still at the same time allows to develop EU’s 
capabilities. We have to be considerate in our words and in our actions” (Interview 1FI). 
As already noted before, Finland sees both strong internal and external cooperation as an 
important part of developing EU’s defence capabilities. As such, all the interviewees had 
a common understanding that strategic autonomy of the EU is not something that can 
happen in isolation. One of the Finnish government officials further elaborated: “We 
think that “strategic autonomy” can actually also be, let’s say a tool or a principle to 
recognise complementary partnerships and foster stronger practices of cooperation. After 
all, it is not only making the EU a more capable actor, but also a more credible actor.” 
(Interview 3FI). “Complementarity” as such is one of the key words that all the 
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interviewees stressed as an important element in Finland’s approach to the objective of 
strategic autonomy. 
Along those lines, all the interviewees also noted that none of the EU defence initiatives 
should exclude collaboration with third countries. One of the government officials 
specifically stressed that “the EU will risk becoming inwards-looking and self-sabotaging 
its efforts of becoming a more capable defence actor, if it excludes collaboration with 
close partners outside the Union, such as Norway, UK, the United States and Canada” 
(Interview 2FI). From the Finnish perspective, this type of cooperation will rather bring 
added value to the projects launched under the EU initiatives and therefore also support 
the goal of strategic autonomy (Interview 2FI; Interview 4FI; Interview 5FI). The Finnish 
also believe that a more open approach will help to ensure that the projects will be carried 
out inside of the EU frameworks and not taken out in order to accommodate the non-EU 
partners (Interview 3FI). Overly exclusive nature of the EU initiatives is therefore seen 
as counterproductive in Finland. As such, all the interviewees agreed that the guidance 
for third party participation should be flexible and leave room for maneuver for the project 
groups themselves to adapt appropriate rules on case by case basis. 
To conclude, in terms of exclusivity and inclusivity, the Finnish policy-makers 
understanding of the notion of strategic autonomy is prone to the latter. In the viewpoint 
of Finland, none of the European defence ambitions should come at the expense of strong 
partnerships. Rather, the goal to be a more capable actor in security and defence should 
foster strong cooperation within and beyond the EU. 
The means of achieving strategic autonomy 
The Finnish policy-makers firmly believe that the EU defence cooperation, and CSDP as 
a whole, that form the basis of European strategic autonomy must be developed in line 
with the EU Global Strategy and foundations laid down by the Lisbon treaty (Interview 
1FI; Interview 2FI; Interview 5FI). The documental basis, instruments, and initiatives that 
are already in place within the EU framework are seen to be the key tools to be used in 
order to address the capability gaps of Europe and enhance strategic autonomy. All the 
interviewees noted that CARD, PESCO, and EDF are steps in the right direction. The 
general understanding in Finland is that the EU member states should now concentrate 
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on implementation and reaching results. Something that all the interviewees stressed is 
that from the Finnish perspective, the possibility to achieve strategic autonomy depends 
mainly on the political will of the member states. This means the will to increase defence 
spending, the will to launch meaningful projects that help to overcome the capability 
shortfalls, and the will to engage in more ambitious collective action in the CSDP 
(Interview 1FI; Interview 4FI; Interview 5FI). The Finnish decision-makers also 
recognise that this willingness is not easy to find and the process of capability 
development always takes time (Interview 4FI): 
It seems that what the EU as an organisation can do is now done. It is really up to 
the member states now to carry out these things which they have committed to 
when joining those new defence initiatives, such as PESCO. So, the 
implementation of these things is now in the European capitals and let’s see if 
there is, if there is enough willingness to make it happen.  
Several interviewees noted that one of the main obstacles to achieving strategic autonomy 
is the fact that European defence landscape is currently characterised by lack of 
cooperation and interoperability (Interview 3FI, Interview 5FI). Hence, the Finnish 
policy-makers believe that higher coordination at the EU level, which is already slowly 
taking shape, could also “revitalise European defence landscape” (Interview 3FI) and 
foster strategic autonomy. However, the interviewees also stressed that for Finland, 
European strategic autonomy does not rest only on the cooperation taking place among 
the Europeans themselves (Interview 1FI; Interview 3FI). Complementary partnerships 
are believed to be the key in fulfilling European security and defence ambitions. The 
interviewees specifically highlighted that from the viewpoint of Finland, it is crucial to 
have strategic discussions with the necessary institutions inside of the EU as well as with 
NATO and key strategic partners, such as the US, that will ensure that capacity 
development that is central to European strategic autonomy is pursued in a harmonised 
way that will benefit all the parties involved in the regional defence landscape (Interview 
3FI; Interview 4FI). 
Lastly, all the interviewees highlighted that from the perspective of Finland, the EU’s 
strategic autonomy, or that of Europe’s that of, does not rely only on military capabilities. 
On the opposite, the Finnish policy-makers believe that the EU should be as 
comprehensive as possible in its approach to fostering strategic autonomy and seek 
improvement across various domains of hard and soft power. (Interview 1FI; Interview 
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3FI; Interview 4FI). The key areas that the interviewees pointed out as priorities included: 
responding to hybrid threats, military mobility, resilience building, creating arrangements 
for security of supply, and continuing efforts to improve the EU’s civilian crisis 
management toolbox (Interview 1FI; Interview 2FI; Interview 5FI). The overall logic of 
the Finnish viewpoint was well summarised by one of the government officials: “…in 
today’s security environment, the ability to decide autonomously and act autonomously 
goes beyond military equipment and I think that here in Finland we all agree that the areas 
in which the EU can be the leading actor for stability and security are not so much about 
hard defence.” (Interview 3FI). 
To conclude, with regard to means of achieving strategic autonomy, the Finnish policy-
makers highlight the need to develop European capabilities in line with the EU’s renewed 
documental basis and defence initiatives. Enhanced defence cooperation within the Union 
but also with strategic partners outside is seen to be the key here. From the viewpoint of 
Finland, the collective action and capacity development that fosters strategic autonomy 
should be comprehensive and go beyond the domain of hard security. 
Fit into the current regional security architecture 
All the interviewees stressed that Finland fully recognises the centrality of NATO in 
European defence and European strategic autonomy should never become something that 
contradicts with that. The interviewees univocally pointed out that Finland in particular 
has a strong interest in an effective and results-oriented strategic partnership between the 
EU and NATO. As such, the common message that came across all the interviews was 
that from the Finnish perspective, European strategic autonomy should always be 
complementary to the transatlantic partnership. Furthermore, the interviewees highlighted 
that in light of the increased focus on defence in the EU, it is crucial to guard against the 
potential risks of overlap (Interview 3FI; Interview 4FI). There is a common view in 
Helsinki that it is possible to avoid duplication of tasks, structures and unnecessary 
bureaucracy, if there is a pragmatic approach and realistic assessment of each 
organisation’s competencies, capabilities and mandates (Interview 2FI; Interview 3FI; 
Interview 4FI). In this respect, for Finland, “more EU in defence does most definitely not 
mean less NATO” (Interview 3FI).  
   53 
 
One of the Finnish government officials further elaborated (Interview 4FI): 
NATO remains the cornerstone for defence in Europe. The EU is not becoming 
another collective defence organisation as NATO already does that. And whatever 
the EU does, on the side of, let’s say hard military defence, it should be carefully 
coordinated and harmonised with the ongoing work in NATO, so it does not create 
extra work for NATO countries, or take away resources from NATO goals. On 
the contrary, it should always aim for the same objectives. Within those 
parameters, we think, there is a lot that the EU can and should do on a very broad 
range of issues. 
The fear of the quest for European strategic autonomy hindering the EU-NATO relations 
seems to be less prevalent in Finland than in some of the strong Atlanticist member states 
of the EU. Several interviewees pointed out that the word “autonomy” may simply be 
misleading, but the thinking behind this increased responsibility does not contradict the 
transatlantic partnership in any way (Interview 1FI; Interview 3FI). However, the Finnish 
government officials also stressed that even if it is only a matter of communication, it is 
important to ensure that European strategic autonomy is not presented as something 
“…from or against the NATO and the US” (Interview 4FI). There is a feeling in Helsinki 
that it really is the language that has been harmful when outlining the defence ambitions 
of the EU, not the strategic objective of strategic autonomy itself. As summarised by one 
of the interviewees (Interview 3FI): 
We really have to explain to the other side of the Atlantic that what we are doing 
is also gaining them. The initial strategic communication really has been poor. 
Actually, whatever Europe is doing at the moment, is exactly that what the US 
has from the beginning wanted – to put more effort to our own capabilities. And 
this matters a lot.  
To conclude, “complementarity”, not “competition” – that is how the notion of strategic 
autonomy is perceived from the Finnish perspective in relation to the regional strategic 
architecture that rests on the transatlantic partnership. From the viewpoint of Finland, a 
stronger Europe goes hand in hand with a stronger NATO. 
Summary: The Finnish understanding of strategic autonomy 
Finland, representing a neutral member state, understands strategic autonomy mainly as 
a notion that is based on the idea of increased European responsibility in security and 
defence. This means a responsibility to protect European interests by European means, 
responsibility to promote peace and stability not only within but also outside of the 
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borders of the EU, and a responsibility to be a capable strategic partner. From the Finnish 
perspective, the key to achieving this autonomy is developing European capabilities 
across the various domains of hard defence as well as resilience building, military 
mobility, responses to hybrid threats and civilian crisis management. This capability 
development seen to be rest equally on enhanced cooperation within the EU, but also with 
strategic partners outside of the Union. In Finland’s view, strategic autonomy is always 
something that should remain complementary to the strong transatlantic partnership. As 
such, the Finnish policy-makers believe that more EU in defence does not mean less 
NATO, rather stronger Europe means also stronger NATO. 
 
3.5. Estonia: Strategic Autonomy as Picking up Our Share of the Burden 
 
What should “strategic autonomy” entail? 
From the viewpoint of Estonia, European strategic autonomy means developing greater 
capacity and capability “to be a more reliable rather than an independent defence actor 
(Interview 2EE, translation by the author). All the interviewees stressed that for Estonia 
“strategic autonomy” is not so much an end in itself, but it is the process of improving 
European defence posture that should be central to this notion. The policy-makers in 
Estonia agree that the idea of strategic autonomy entails a political, operational and 
industrial dimension, but the interviewees also univocally noted that in all those areas, 
European focus should be on increased efficiency and making additional contributions 
for eliminating main shortcomings, not on doing things alone. As one of the interviewees 
further noted: “Going it alone should always be seen as the last resort for Europe” 
(Interview 3EE, translation by the author). From the Estonian perspective, therefore, 
“strategic autonomy” as an ambition is always relative (Interview 1EE; Interview 4EE) 
and happens in conjunction with strong partnerships (Interview 1EE; Interview 2EE). 
A key question that Estonian decision-makers take into consideration when discussing 
“strategic autonomy” is: To do what? (Interview 1EE; Interview 3EE; Interview 4EE) 
There is a clear understanding in Estonia that EU should by no means overstretch its 
mandate and the aim of strategic autonomy must not be redefining the foundations of 
European defence. All the interviewees highlighted that collective defence, for example, 
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is be far beyond the EU’s reach and should remain strictly in the realm of NATO. 
However, this perspective does not imply that there are no areas in which the EU should 
have an increased capacity to act. For example, when it comes to stabilising the EU’s 
wider neighbourhood, all the interviewees found that there is a shared understanding 
among the Europeans that it is one of the critical issue areas where the EU has to be more 
capable. Yet, the interviewees also noted that in Estonia’s view, reaching a point where 
the EU would actually be able to carry out and sustain large-scale military operations is 
not realistic in near future, if ever (Interview 1EE; Interview 3EE). As one of the 
government officials concluded: “For us this is a simple fact.” (Interview 1EE, translation 
by the author). As such, there is a consensus in Tallinn that strategic autonomy in terms 
of relying only on Europeans means in defence action is an unreachable wish 
All in all, the message that came forward in all the interviews is that Estonia would prefer 
to avoid any far-reaching discussion around the idea of European strategic autonomy as 
a concept that implies self-sufficiency or rests on grandiose visions about the “rebirth” of 
European defence. If anything, the common understanding in Estonia is that Europe’s 
focus should remain on being a responsible actor in the field of security and defence 
(Interview 1EE; Interview 2EE). All the interviewees also noted that this responsibility 
does not mean that the EU, or Europe in general, should take new obligations that it is 
most likely unable to fulfil. Not at all. Rather, from the viewpoint of Estonia, it means 
that Europe should bear the responsibilities it has already committed to, as those are 
“multiple and demanding enough” (Interview 1EE, translation by the author). This 
includes European countries stepping up their defence spending, the continuing efforts of 
stabilising its wider neighbourhood, as well as delivering on the recently launched EU 
defence initiatives (Interview 1EE; Interview 2EE; Interview 3EE). For Estonia, 
therefore, “…the notion of strategic autonomy in many ways remains linked to picking 
up our share of the burden.” (Interview 2EE, translation by the author). 
To conclude, Estonia defines European strategic autonomy in terms of developing greater 
capacity and capability to be a more reliable defence actor that can better care for its 
interests, but also be a strong strategic partner. For Estonia, the notion of strategic 
autonomy should not, and realistically cannot, imply self-sufficiency, whether it be 
operational or defence-industrial. Rather, it means seeking improvement. 
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Exclusivity and inclusivity as it relates to the notion of strategic autonomy 
Several interviewees noted that from the Estonian perspective, the notion of “strategic 
autonomy” is seen as somewhat troublesome mainly because the first question that would 
usually follow this term would be: Autonomy from whom? (Interview 1EE; Interview 
2EE). All the interviewees stressed that creating any dividing lines between the EU and 
its strategic partners, is unacceptable for Estonia. Therefore, if there is anything that 
Estonia wants to avoid with the notion of European strategic autonomy it is the sense of 
exclusivity, both on a conceptual and practical level. In Estonia’s view strengthening the 
EU in the field of security and defence should not be seen strictly as a European project 
(Interview 2EE, Interview 3EE). Yes, increased European cooperation is central to 
strategic autonomy, but all the interviewees agreed that in their view it can only happen 
together with strategic partners from the outside. One of the interviewees further 
elaborated: “Effective cooperation with its partners has never been optional for the EU. 
It is necessary, almost obligatory. The key partners obviously include NATO and the US. 
And now, now when we are moving forward in the area of defence, we must make sure 
that we move together with those partners.” (Interview 2EE, translation by the author). 
From the viewpoint of Estonia, the EU should always remain pragmatic in its actions 
(Interview 3EE; Interview 4EE). All the interviewees shared the understanding that 
overcoming the defence capability gaps that Europe has is impossible when working 
alone. This also means that Estonia supports a flexible approach on the issue of third party 
involvement in the EU defence initiatives, including PESCO projects. Several 
interviewees noted that cooperation with partners, such as the US, post-Brexit UK, or 
Norway will be added value, would it be in terms of sharing technological solutions or 
offering expertise on best practices (Interview 1EE; Interview 3EE). The policy-makers 
in Estonia all share the opinion that the conditions to be set for third parties to participate 
in the EU defence projects should therefore not be too rigid. As one of the interviewees 
noted, it would simply be “short-sighted” (Interview 1EE, translation by the author). 
Much like the other supporters of the more inclusive approach, Estonians also believe that 
overly strict rules on third party participation will result in the cooperation taking place 
out of the EU frameworks, which would make initiatives like PESCO much less 
meaningful and eventually ambush the idea of strategic autonomy (Interview 1EE; 
Interview 2EE; Interview 4EE).  
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To conclude, from the perspective of Estonia, strategic autonomy is not exclusively a 
“European thing”. In Estonia’s view, a stronger Europe in defence will always also benefit 
our partners, and benefit from our partners. Or, as summarised by one of the Estonian 
government officials: “We are not ‘dealing’ with defence only inside of the EU. It will 
never be the case. We really have to be open-minded in all the developments that are 
currently taking place” (Interview 2EE, translation by the author). 
 The means of achieving strategic autonomy 
In Estonia’s view European security and defence ambitions, including strategic 
autonomy, depend on the availability of adequate resources. All the interviewees 
univocally stressed that question of defence spending remains central in this context. The 
general understanding in Estonia is that there is not much room for talking about a more 
capable Europe in defence, whether it be in the context of the EU or NATO, if the 
European states do not support their promises with appropriate levels of spending on 
defence. As articulated by one of the interviewees: “We should firstly focus on the 
promises and commitments that we have already made and make sure that we are actually 
fulfilling those. Stepping up the defence spending is simply unavoidable here. Only after 
that we can think about taking more responsibilities or aiming for something like strategic 
autonomy. It sounds like a simple first step towards a stronger Europe in security and 
defence affairs, but often the simple things are the hardest.” (Interview EE1, translation 
by the author).  
From the perspective of Estonia, what logically follows the appropriate expenditure on 
defence is capability development. As such, Estonia’s thinking is in line with the overall 
understanding that in order for the EU to be more capable to act based on it security 
interests it needs appropriate material means. All the interviewees noted that developing 
strategic enablers as well focusing on issues, such as military mobility and 
interoperability, are crucial steps to fulfil European defence goals. The new EU 
cooperation initiatives that seek to support these objectives, such as PESCO and EDF, are 
thus welcomed in Estonia. The interviewees shared the opinion that projects that address 
Europe’s shortcomings and foster cross-border defence industrial cooperation, 
integration, consolidation and investments are all seen in a positive light. Yet, the 
interviewees also stressed that Europe must remain realistic in ambitions and a full 
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spectrum of high-end capabilities will most likely remain out of reach for the EU 
(Interview 1EE; Interview 3EE). Rather, Estonians would prefer to think of capability 
development as “a gradual process that aims for improvement of European defence” 
(Interview 2EE, translation by the author). 
There is also a shared understanding in Estonia that in the end the achieving strategic 
autonomy, or simply a more capable Europe in defence and security will depend on the 
willingness of the EU member states. All the interviewees shared the opinion that there 
simply is not any common European security and defence policy, not to mention 
European strategic autonomy, if the member states will not make it happen. As one of the 
policy-makers noted: “Even if the EU is able to foster defence cooperation in terms of 
capability development it does not automatically mean that the European states are 
willing to put those capabilities into use.” (Interview 2EE, translation by the author). In 
Estonia’s view, strengthening European solidarity and common strategic thinking is 
therefore also a crucial part of moving towards strategic autonomy (Interview 1EE; 
Interview 4EE). What remains somewhat open-ended is, where the unity should derive 
from. While cooperation taking place in the EU frameworks is seen to reinforce it 
(Interview 1EE; Interview 2EE), all the interviewees mentioned that the common 
European mind-set will also benefit from other multilateral formats of cooperation taking 
place outside of the EU structures. 
To summarise, with regard to means of achieving strategic autonomy, the Estonian 
understanding highlights three key elements: increased European defence spending, 
capability development that takes into consideration both, the needs and available 
resources of Europe, and fostering a common European strategic thought by enhanced 
defence cooperation within and beyond the EU framework.  
Fit into the current regional security architecture 
For Estonia, NATO is the cornerstone of European security architecture and this must 
remain unchanged. All the interviewees were very clear about this aspect. As such, there 
is a concern in Estonia that too overt a European drive in the direction of autonomy could 
fuel US isolationism. One of the interviewees specifically noted: “There would be very 
legitimate questions from the US: ‘If you are seeking autonomy...then we can go home, 
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right?.’ That’s exactly what we don’t want.” (Interview 3EE, translation by the author). 
Hence, from the Estonian perspective it is crucial to ensure that the increased European 
defence integration would not result in contradictions with the transatlantic alliance. 
Several interviewees highlighted that some of the statements made by European leaders 
about the goal of European strategic autonomy have been nothing else than harmful 
(Interview 1EE; Interview 3EE; Interview 4EE). One of the examples that the 
interviewees brought up were the references to a European army that is considered to 
simply send off “a completely wrong message” (Interview 1EE, translation by the author). 
From the perspective of Estonia, the objective of strategic autonomy “fits” into the current 
security architecture only if both planned and communicated with care. Or as one of the 
Estonian officials put it (Interview 2EE, translation by the author):  
We have to understand that each act of communication has two sides. We have to 
be practical both in our words and in our actions. We simply cannot cut our ties 
with the partners that we need. 
On a more practical level, however, Estonia supports the idea of the Europeans doing 
more for their security and by that also strengthening the transatlantic partnership. All the 
interviewees noted that the debates on fairer burden sharing have been present for a long 
time and it is not only the current US Administration that has been vocal about this issue, 
thus in a way the notion of pursuing strategic autonomy could be a response to this need 
to do more. One of the interviewees further elaborated: “The US has always pushed for 
Europe to be less dependent, not to free-ride, and to shoulder more of the burden in terms 
of security. So, in this sense, sure we are actually trying to do much of what the US has 
been asking for over the years.” (Interview 1EE, translation by the author). As pointed 
out by several interviewees, developing certain critical capabilities for the EU to be less 
reliant on the US is definitely not a negative thing (Interview 1EE; Interview 4EE). On 
the opposite, if planned wisely, it is believed to be beneficial to both parties involved 
(Interview 1EE). Along those same lines, all the interviewees agreed that overarching 
principle for Estonia is that the capability development taken within the EU should always 
complement not contradict NATO. However, the question that prevails among the 
Estonian decision-makers is: “Should these steps of doing more and better be carried out 
under the name of strategic autonomy?” (Interview 3EE, translation by the author). 
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To conclude, in the Estonian understanding strategic autonomy, defined as increased 
European defence capacity, can be something that strengthens the transatlantic alliance. 
However, this means that the Europeans themselves have to be clear and realistic in their 
words and actions.  
Summary: The Estonian understanding of strategic autonomy 
In the Estonian understanding European strategic autonomy refers to developing greater 
capacity and capability to be a more reliable defence actor that can better care for its 
interests, but also be a strong strategic partner. For Estonia, the notion of strategic 
autonomy does not imply self-sufficiency, rather it is the process of becoming more 
efficient and responsible in security and defence related matters that counts the most. 
From the perspective of Estonia, strategic autonomy cannot be exclusively a European 
project. The developed capabilities that lie at the heart of this notion are seen to be a 
benefit to and benefit from cooperation with key strategic partners. With regard to means 
of achieving strategic autonomy, the Estonian understanding highlights three steps: 
increased European defence spending, capability development that takes into 
consideration the needs and available resources of Europe, and fostering a common 
European strategic thought by enhanced defence cooperation within and beyond the EU 
framework. From the viewpoint of Estonia, strategic autonomy can be something that 
strengthens the transatlantic alliance as this ambition remains interlinked with Europeans 
picking up their part of the burden. However, this is possible only if the Europeans to not 
get lost in recklessness and overt drive towards autonomy. 
 
3.6. Discussion: Where Do the Differences Lie? 
 
When we compare the five different national interpretations of the notion of European 
strategic autonomy, what stands out is that the point of departure is rather similar for all 
the member states, meaning that “strategic autonomy” is first and foremost understood 
Europe’s capacity to act as Europe in security and defence related matters. In their 
thinking, the member states have to a large degree also adopted the commonly referred to 
three dimensions of strategic autonomy: ability to decide, to carry out operations, and to 
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secure one’s defence-industrial base. As such, all the member states also share the opinion 
that strategic autonomy can only be achieved if Europe puts more effort in addressing its 
capability gaps and further enhances defence cooperation within and outside of the EU 
framework. Therefore it can be said that the differences in the national interpretations of 
“strategic autonomy” are not as big as one could initially expect. Yet, the devil is in the 
details. The member states do not diverge on technicalities, but rather on visions about 
the finality of the objective of strategic autonomy and the consequences that come with 
it. Is it about more Europe, or simply better Europe? If there is more Europe, does this 
mean that there is less room for our strategic partners? If there is less room for our 
strategic partners, what does it mean for European security? 
Taking a step further from those abstract questions, it can be argued that the national 
understandings of the notion European strategic autonomy diverge mainly on three issues: 
whether the aim of this goal is to become a self-sufficient actor in the field of security and 
defence or is the process of gradual capability development and deeper integration an end 
in itself; the degree of exclusivity implied by “strategic autonomy”; and is this ambition 
perceived as a potential threat to transatlantic values and the current regional security 
architecture. Here, it is possible to see a clear distinction between Europeanist states, such 
as France, whose ambitions are higher, emphasis on the European “ownership” of the 
developed cooperation frameworks and capabilities stronger, and concerns about the 
increased European drive in defence hindering the transatlantic partnership smaller, 
opposed to the Atlanticists, such as the Netherlands and Estonia, for whom it is the other 
way around. Albeit for different reasons, Germany and Finland appear to be somewhere 
in the middle of the two extremes. Between those three main points of divergence there 
is room for some twists and turns. For example, the German understanding of strategic 
autonomy being strongly linked to the wider European integration process, the Finnish 
stressing the aspect of responsibility, or the French focus on shared European strategic 
culture as one of the key enablers of strategic autonomy. 
To conclude, the comparison of the five country cases sows that “strategic autonomy” as 
a linguistic concept, but also as a strategic objective, does not have a single objective 
meaning across different EU member states. However, these divergences do not mean 
that there are no overlaps. The picture of similarities/differences is more nuanced. In this 
sense, we are talking about different interpretations of the same thing, not of completely 
   62 
 
different things. The need for a more capable Europe in defence really is not questioned 
by anyone. Instead, the key divergences that stand out in the national interpretations of 
strategic autonomy revolve around different levels of ambition and different fears. 
Whereas this Chapter has established the empirical reality of divergent national 
interpretations of the notion of strategic autonomy, the following Chapter turns to the 
practical implications of this multiplicity and explores whether divergent meanings of EU 
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4. FROM DIVERGENT INTERPRETATIONS TO PRACTICAL 
COOPERATION: THE CASE OF PESCO 
 
The following section analyses whether the multiplicity of national understandings of the 
notion of European strategic autonomy that stem from the ambiguity of this concept pose 
a substantial problem for cooperation aimed to achieve this goal, as perceived by the 
policy-makers in the member states themselves. In doing so, the focus is set on PESCO 
as one of the most telling examples of a platform for cooperative action to facilitate the 
development of European defence capabilities and contribute to deeper political 
integration in the areas of security and defence.  
PESCO as a tool facilitating strategic autonomy 
What stands out from the conducted expert interviews is the fact that all the respondents 
across the five country cases consider PESCO to be a platform that in principle supports 
the goal of strategic autonomy. That despite of the differences in their interpretations of 
the meaning of “strategic autonomy” as a concept. All the policy-makers and experts 
shared the opinion that PESCO provides a flexible tool to facilitate collaborative 
development of capabilities and therefore also enhance political willingness to be more 
united in security and defence affairs. As previously illustrated by the comparison of the 
five national understandings of the notion of strategic autonomy, at the basic level, these 
two aspects are considered to be a prerequisite to strategic autonomy in all the member 
states.  
In fact, it appears that even if ambiguous and open to interpretation, the goal of strategic 
autonomy has brought the member states closer together within the PESCO framework. 
Member states that have always strived for more European action in the field of security 
and defence, and also have higher ambitions regarding European strategic autonomy, find 
confidence from PESCO that their partners in the EU are now thinking more similarly to 
them and with enough political will the cooperation fostered within these type of 
initiatives can lead to tangible results (Interview 4FR; Interview 5FR). As noted by one 
of the French government officials (Interview 4FR): 
The fact that the EU is finally making more efforts to address capability gaps and 
preserve the European defence-technological base is of course regarded in a 
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positive light in Paris. We have always supported that. And the implementation 
of initiatives like PESCO allows to think, and it really is our hope, that most our 
European friends understand as well as we do that the security environment has 
changed and we have to adapt. The steps that we are taking now can be a 
beginning of a real meaningful change.   
At the same time, the member states that remain somewhat more cautious about the 
increased European drive in defence see benefit in the flexibility of the new initiatives 
and consider PESCO to be an important first step towards gradual improvement of 
European defence posture and taking more responsibility (e.g. Interview 2NL; Interview 
1EE, Interview 3FI). For example, one of the Dutch interviewees noted (Interview 1NL): 
It is important to start from somewhere. PESCO addresses many key issues in 
terms of capability development and bettering defence cooperation. For us it is 
also very much about taking strategic responsibility that is very much needed for 
everything and everybody.  
These findings support the claims made in the literature on constructive ambiguity (e.g. 
Hoffmann, 2000; Rayroux, 2014), indicating that the ambiguous goal of strategic 
autonomy allows member states to project their ideas into the concept and gather the 
potential supporters together under a specific cooperation format that each state actor then 
also perceives to fit their expectations of practical action prescribed by their interpretation 
of the given goal. As such, ambiguity is actually conducive to cooperation.  
However, this openness to interpretation comes with limits as a certain gap is still 
expected to prevail between the nationally validated expectations and the reality of the 
established cooperation initiatives. This can be well illustrated by the case of France and 
EI2 as an alternative arena for action that all the French interviewees highlighted as of 
high importance for France. As described in the Chapter 3.2., the French understanding 
of European strategic autonomy puts emphasis on operational capacity as well as shared 
strategic thought. Since PESCO may fall short on the French ambitions, i.e. it does not 
fully accommodate its vision of strategic autonomy, France then also pursues its aims 
elsewhere. Similarly, the member states that understand “strategic autonomy” more as a 
gradual process of capability development and are sceptical towards the idea of self-
sufficiency as it is often perceived to be linked to isolation, carry this interpretation with 
the potential to pull back from PESCO if it proves to be too much. As noted by one of the 
Dutch interviewees: “We see European defence cooperation one step at a time, and 
well…I would not but my money on it, but there could be a day when the Netherlands 
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says: ‘No, we are doing this, but we are not going any further’.” (Interview 3NL). Neither 
of those factors mean that cooperation taking place in the PESCO format is doomed to 
failure. Rather, it means that cooperation built upon ambiguous strategic objectives 
always remains vulnerable to the multiplicity of interpretations. 
To conclude, from the perspective of the analysed member states, PESCO as a tool rather 
than an end in itself is seen if not directly lead to then at least support the goal of European 
strategic autonomy, or increased strategic responsibility, however it is defined. In fact, it 
appears to be the ambiguity of the goal of strategic autonomy that has helped to foster EU 
defence cooperation in institutionalised formats, such as PESCO. Ambiguity, however, 
always has its limitations: when cooperation proceeds contradictions may arise between 
what the state actors want and what they are actually offered in the collective setting. 
The member states’ perceptions about ambiguity and cooperation 
One of the government officials from Estonia noted: “Diversity of visions is part of the 
EU by design.” (Interview 2EE, translation by the author). No one in the interviews really 
questions this fact. The decision-makers all around Europe are well aware that “strategic 
autonomy” as a concept can mean many different things to many different people and to 
many different member states (e.g. Interview 4DE; Interview 3NL; Interview 5FR). 
However, even if the member states do not have a shared understanding of the exact 
meaning of “strategic autonomy”, there still is a common ground to be found in a belief 
that Europe should simply do more for its security. Meaning that, the broad overarching 
goal may already be sufficient even if a more precise goal is not clearly defined. A thought 
that echoed through many interviews across the five cases was well articulated by one of 
the officials from the Netherlands (Interview 4NL):  
I think that the fact that “strategic autonomy” is a blurry term that can be 
understood in many ways is definitely also felt here in Brussels at the moment. 
But the overall observation, which I believe is even more relevant, is that if we 
approach “strategic autonomy” as a concept and try to come up with a common 
definition, or a common understanding what it means, I think that we can already 
predict at the beginning that it is not possible. But I would also say that it is not 
necessarily something that is a huge issue. Sure, we have to discuss our ambitions 
with each other and try to find some more focus. However, what matters more is 
the action that we are taking. When we look at the practical developments that are 
currently taking place with the new EU defence initiatives, you cannot really say 
that the member states are not moving in the same direction. 
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Even if “strategic autonomy” as an ambition does not strike with clarity and the member 
states themselves perceive that it lacks a common understanding, then PESCO as a 
framework is instead believed to bring some structure to the European defence ambitions 
and in realising the goal of strategic autonomy, however defined. Interviewees from all 
the five member shared the opinion that the fact that the member states are finally together 
behind the same table and the EU has an institutionalised setup for defence cooperation 
is already a win on its own. The policy-makers stressed that the actual experience of doing 
defence projects together, getting familiarised with the PESCO mechanisms, 
communicating and learning from each other will help to bring more focus to the 
European defence goals and along those lines also feed into the collective understanding 
of strategic autonomy at the EU level (e.g. Interview 4DE; Interview 2EE; Interview 2FR; 
Interview 4NL). Or, as noted by one of the Finnish government officials: “Ultimately, we 
will define “strategic autonomy” by our action. The initiatives that we have launched now 
– PESCO, CARD, EDF – I think that those are already a good example of what strategic 
autonomy should entail, or mean. So, also for our partners, it is maybe the most important 
thing to show what we mean by it all by practice.” (Interview 1FI). 
With regard to practical developments taking place at the PESCO framework, several 
government officials noted that the first two rounds of PESCO projects have been mainly 
about exploring the ground and having something “to take home for your government” 
(Interview 1DE; Interview 4DE; Interview 2EE; Interview 3FR; Interview 3NL). There 
are, however, a couple of projects that are commonly viewed as potential success stories 
that well represent the renewed European defence ambitions, one of them being the 
EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core (EUFOR CROC) and the second Military 
Mobility (Interview 1DE; Interview 2DE; Interview 1EE; Interview 3FI; Interview 4FI; 
Interview 4FR; Interview 5FR; Interview 1NL; Interview 3NL). All in all, all the member 
states seem to share the opinion that it remains to be seen where PESCO will lead to in 
terms of acquired capabilities, but there definitely is potential to the framework and at 
this stage the policy-makers are not overly concerned about the member states moving in 
completely different directions (e.g. Interview 3DE; Interview 5FR; Interview 4NL). 
With regard to the impact of divergent interpretations of “strategic autonomy”, this then 
means that effective cooperation is possible in spite of the openness of the goal to multiple 
understandings. 
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Another common thread that ran through the interviews is that much of the concerns that 
the member states perceive to hinder the cooperative action within the PESCO framework 
are political rather than dependent on the divergent understandings of the goal of 
European strategic autonomy. Some of the key problem areas that the interviewees 
brought up were: the guiding principle of national sovereignty in security and defence 
related matters that makes it difficult to hand over the decision-making powers, national 
defence-industrial interests that at times may not be in line with broader European 
interests and lack of willingness to increase defence spending in many European states 
(Interview 5DE; Interview 1EE; Interview 4FI; Interview 1FR; Interview 3NL). The 
interviewees noted that overcoming these issues is mainly a matter of political will, but 
the peculiarities of security and defence policy and the overarching question of national 
self-interest make it rather difficult. 
In conclusion, it can be said that from the perspective of the member states the 
cooperation taking place within the PESCO framework does not appear to suffer under 
the ambiguity of the goal of strategic autonomy that it is supposed to support. Rather, the 
cooperative action itself is believed to bring more clarity about the direction in which the 
member states are willing to move together. These findings of the analysis then again 
support the argument that divergent understandings of a specific strategic objective are 
not necessarily hindering to cooperative action and it is social interaction that plays the 
key role in overcoming collective action dilemmas. 
Fault lines 
While the decision-makers are not perceiving the ambiguity of the goal of strategic 
autonomy that PESCO should serve as a substantial obstacle to practical cooperation 
among the member states, the interviews revealed certain issue areas where the different 
national visions about the objective of European strategic autonomy have resulted in 
disagreements. Rather than set-in-stone obstacles to cooperative action, these problems 
should be viewed as fault lines that may cause the cooperation to fail if not managed with 
care.  
The first point of fracture concerns the strategic horizon of PESCO, meaning if this 
cooperation format should rather be goal-oriented or open-ended. More specifically, this 
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refers to the issue of capability development in the absence of a common agreement of 
what the EU will do with these capabilities. As noted in Chapter 3.6., one of the aspects 
on which the member states diverge in their understandings of “strategic autonomy” is 
whether it is about aiming for self-sufficiency and EU operational capacity, or is the 
gradual capability development and increased defence integration already an end in itself. 
Whereas France has undeniably the highest ambitions in this regard, the other four 
countries included in the study are more focused on the process that could eventually lead 
to strategic autonomy rather than the end-goal itself. As such, from the viewpoint of 
France, PESCO should be used at a higher level of ambition and the capability 
development projects should first and foremost address the operational needs of Europe 
in the full range of scenarios (Interview 4FR; Interview 5FR). At the same time, the 
Netherlands, Estonia, Finland, and also Germany, remain more open-ended in their 
approach (Interview 2EE; Interview 4DE; Interview 1FI; Interview 5FI; Interview 3NL).  
While this divergence of visions has not manifested itself as an outstanding issue in the 
current early stages of cooperation, it may pose obstacles in the following rounds of 
PESCO projects, as the interviewees themselves also noted that more focus is required 
(Interview 2DE; Interview 4DE; Interview 2EE; Interview FI1; Interview FR5; Interview 
3NL). Some key capabilities are relevant regardless of the missions that will or will not 
be conducted, but there are also several areas where clarity on finality is needed, such as 
high-end warfare or strategic enablers. Collision of different ambitions can make it more 
difficult to launch projects that as a sum will please everyone and lead to tangible results. 
Or as some of the policy-makers themselves noted, “…a situation where you have agreed 
on the direction in which Europe should ahead in defence-related matters, but some want 
to move significantly faster than others becomes often very difficult to manage.” 
(Interview 3FI). Therefore, member states reaching a reasoned consensus on the strategic 
horizon of PESCO remains important in order to ensure the success of cooperation. 
There is, however, another unresolved question that has proven to be a significant issue 
already now, that being the third party participation in PESCO projects.4 As the 
analysis of the national interpretations of “strategic autonomy” in Chapter 3 illustrated, 
                                                          
4 The current set up of PESCO stipulates that member states may invite third countries to take part in 
projects to which they can bring substantial added value, but the more specific conditions remain undefined. 
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the issue of exclusivity and inclusivity as it relates to the notion of European strategic 
autonomy is one of the key aspects on which the member states diverge on. To recapture 
the member states’ positions: Out of the five countries included in the study, France is the 
only one that has a clear preference for strict regulations on third party participation to 
keep in minimal. Germany faces internal divisions on the issue, but seems to have 
gradually adopted a more pragmatic approach and prefers to avoid overly rigid rules on 
third party participation. The Netherlands, Finland, and Estonia are all strong supporters 
of an inclusive approach that would allow third parties to participate in the projects in a 
rather flexible way. In relation to the notion of strategic autonomy the main division point 
between the two logics of approaching this issue is: “lessening dependencies vs. added 
value”. 
Several interviewees noted that this question of third party participation really is one of 
the main concerns in Brussels at the moment and little progress has been made with 
finding a consensus on the regulations (Interview 4EE, Interview DE2; Interview 2FR; 
Interview 3NL). The supporters of the inclusive approach, in particular, are extremely 
concerned about the outcome of this disagreement. The main argument from their side is 
that if the rules for third party participation will become too rigid, then the cooperation 
will simply be taken outside from the PESCO framework and the entire attempt for 
increased defence cooperation within the EU becomes meaningless (Interview 1EE; 
Interview 4FI; Interview 3NL). For example, one of the interviewees articulated the 
Dutch perspective as follows: “If it is too hard in PESCO to work with relevant partners, 
if it becomes too complicated, then we will just do it outside of PESCO. We will do it in 
the old-school way in bilateral or multilateral settings. Like we always did, you know. If 
we cannot get the right people around the table within the EU frameworks then we will 
just take it out.” (Interview 3NL). At the same time, countries like France do not believe 
in recreating and reinforcing the capability dependencies as it is seen to contradict the 
overall logic of Europe becoming more autonomous in its security and defence (Interview 
4FR; Interview 5FR).  For France, therefore, inclusivity becomes problematic instead. 
The issue of third party participation in PESCO projects clearly illustrates how divergence 
of interpretation can be contentious and hinder cooperation. This finding is in line with 
the scholarship on “destructive ambiguity” that contends that multiplicity of 
interpretations and lack of a shared understanding of the goal to be achieved is 
   70 
 
problematic to collective action. Now, the question is: how to overcome this obstacle. 
Returning to literature on conceptual plurality and cooperation, one of the arguments there 
is that the key to solve these type of issues are argumentative processes of deliberation 
and true reasoning that, when successful, lead to a reasoned consensus or a common 
understanding (Risse, 2000, 9). This claim also supports the insight offered by the 
interviewees that the goal of strategic autonomy, or simply the efficiency of the 
established defence initiatives, is largely dependent on the political will of the member 
states themselves (e.g. Interview 4DE; Interview 4FI; Interview 5FR). With respect to the 
interplay between ambiguity and cooperation, this then suggests that while multiplicity 
of interpretations can hinder cooperation, overcoming this issue is still not necessarily a 
matter of strategic goals having one definite meaning. 
To conclude, the two fault lines concerning the strategic horizon of PESCO and third 
party participation can be partially seen to be embedded in the divergent national 
understandings of the ambition of strategic autonomy. However, as already noted earlier 
in this Chapter, from the viewpoint of the policy-makers themselves, the main division 
lines are considered to be more political than conceptual. Hence, overcoming those issues 
also appears to be more of a matter of political will than conceptual clarity. 
Summary: Divided in understandings, (almost) united in action? 
In the light of the analysis, it is precisely the ambiguous goal of European strategic 
autonomy that has kick-started the new EU defence initiatives, including PESCO. With 
their own understandings in mind what does this concept and the ambition behind it mean 
and how far one can go with it, the member states got behind the same table and are now 
trying to make it all work. The multiplicity of interpretation, however, comes with limits 
as a certain gap is still expected to persist between the national expectations and the reality 
of the established international cooperation initiatives. 
The ambiguity of the concept “strategic autonomy” has not gone unnoticed for the 
member states. Nevertheless, and this is one of the key findings of this analysis, the 
policy-makers and experts across EU member states perceive the member states to be less 
divided in their actions than they are in their words. All in all, the goal of strategic 
autonomy being open to multiple interpretations it is not seen to be destructive to 
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cooperative action. This by no means implies that the member states do not consider more 
focus in cooperation to be important. Yet, clearer focus in action is not believed to depend 
on a single definite meaning of “strategic autonomy”, but rather on communication as 
such. If anything, the decision-makers affirm that the practical cooperation taking place 
within the PESCO framework and other EU/European defence initiatives is an integral 
part of moving towards a collective interpretation of the goal of strategic autonomy. 
Whilst the ambiguity of the European defence ambitions is not perceived to be a decisive 
obstacle to the cooperative action, it does not mean that the implementation phase of 
PESCO has not faced any problems. Inclusivity/exclusivity and the appropriate strategic 
horizon – the fault lines that have followed PESCO from the very first stages of 
developing this framework are still very much present. In respect of the strategic horizon, 
what differs are the levels of ambition. When the question of inclusivity was formerly 
discussed in relation to bringing together the EU member states themselves, then now the 
focus has shifted on third party participation. This issue appears to be even sharper than 
the one of strategic horizon as the negotiations in Brussels have been going on for a while 
with little progress in sight. To a degree, these differences can be seen to result from 
different understandings of the goal of strategic autonomy. However, from the viewpoint 
of the policy-makers themselves, what may play even a bigger role are political and 
industrial hurdles on national sovereignty and economic interest.  
To conclude, in spite of (or perhaps owing to) the ambiguity of the goal of strategic 
autonomy the cooperative action taking place within the PESCO framework has been 
relatively successful so far. No tangible results cannot be seen yet as it simply takes time, 
but the member states remain united in their hopes for the cooperation to deliver. 
Furthermore, it is also hoped that the collective action and communication taking place 
in the framework of the EU defence initiatives will gradually help to pinpoint the 








After its appearance in the 2016 EU Global Strategy, the concept of strategic autonomy 
has drawn significant attention in academic and political circles alike. As this goal strikes 
with its ambition rather than clarity, there are concerns about the notion of strategic 
autonomy being understood differently across the EU member states, which equally puts 
in doubt the prospects of practical cooperation towards this end. However, the empirical 
reality has so far remained largely unexplored. This, both in terms whether and to what 
extent the divergent interpretations of the objective of European strategic autonomy are 
actually there, and what are the practical implications of those potentially multiple 
understandings for defence cooperation aimed to achieve this goal. Informed by 
constructivist theorising on meaning-making across national contexts and the notions of 
constructive/destructive ambiguity, this study sought to substantiate the existing debates 
on European strategic autonomy by providing empirical insights to it.  
Based on 23 expert interviews with government officials and policy analysts across five 
EU member states, the study first mapped out the national understandings of the concept 
of strategic autonomy in France, the Netherlands, Germany, Finland, and Estonia. In 
doing so, it sought to establish the empirical picture of the diversity of meanings. The 
case selection took into consideration the Atlanticist – Europeanist divide in strategic 
cultures in order to capture the widest possible range of the divergent interpretations. The 
comparison of the five cases then served as a reference point to the second half of the 
empirical research that explored the member states’ perceptions about the effect of the 
multiplicity of interpretations on cooperation, focusing on the practical developments 
taking place within the PESCO framework. 
Two key findings emerged from the analysis. First, at the conceptual level, the EU 
member states indeed understand the notion of strategic autonomy somewhat differently, 
as the diverse interpretive contexts (strategic culture) shape the meanings given to this 
strategic objective. However, while the differences in national interpretations are there, 
they are not insurmountable. At the most basic level, all the analysed member states 
understand the notion as Europe’s capacity to act as Europe in security and defence 
related matters, both together with its partners or alone if so needed. In their thinking, the 
member states have to a large degree also adopted the commonly referred to three 
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dimensions of strategic autonomy, those being the political, operational, and industrial 
dimension. The disagreements, however, emerge in relation to the means and ends of the 
goal of strategic autonomy, that being: whether the aim of it is to become a self-sufficient 
actor in the field of security and defence or is the process of gradual capability 
development and deeper integration an end in itself; the degree of exclusivity implied by 
“strategic autonomy”; and whether a European drive in the direction of autonomy is 
perceived as a potential threat to the transatlantic partnership. Here, it is possible to see a 
clear contrast between the Europeanists (e.g. France), whose ambitions are higher and 
concerns smaller, and the Atlanticists (e.g. the Netherlands) for whom it is vice versa.  
While these findings support the argument that “strategic autonomy” as a concept do not 
have a single definite meaning and the diverse background experiences of the member 
states allow to interpret it differently, the divergence should not be overstated. In terms 
of the interplay between the EU level and domestic level understandings, it seems that 
there might be a “core” meaning to the notion of strategic autonomy – capacity for 
autonomous action – which actually is shared, but there is also a “shell”, referring to 
issues, how to get there, why to get there, and what comes with it, on which there is 
disagreement among the member states. For the ongoing debates on European strategic 
autonomy, this suggests that rather than assuming that different member states are talking 
about completely different things when they are referring to the notion of strategic 
autonomy, it would be more correct to say that they are actually talking about the same 
thing with different levels of ambition and different concerns in mind. In other words, the 
member states agree on some aspects of strategic autonomy, but disagree on others, 
resulting in a nuanced picture of divergence. 
When it comes to the impact of the multiplicity of understandings on practical 
cooperation, the second key finding of this research suggests that despite the degree of 
conceptual ambiguity, the member states have still been relatively successful in fostering 
cooperation that in principle supports the idea of strategic autonomy. In the context of 
PESCO, the decision-makers are not perceiving the ambiguity of the strategic goals that 
it should serve as hindering to practical cooperation, rather the cooperative action itself 
is perceived as something that leads to more clarity and eventually helps to pinpoint the 
member states’ collective level of ambition. In fact, it appears that the ambiguity of the 
objective of strategic autonomy has helped to facilitate EU defence cooperation in 
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institutionalised formats, as its openness to interpretation has allowed potential supporters 
to project their ideas into the concept and get behind the same table. Ambiguity, however, 
always comes with limitations: when cooperation proceeds contradictions often arise 
between what the state actors expect based on their understandings of the goal to be 
achieved and what they are actually offered in the collective setting. This dynamic is to 
some extent already present in the PESCO framework, as the member states diverge on 
the strategic horizon of PESCO (open-ended vs. goal-oriented) and third party 
participation in PESCO projects. While those issues can be seen to reflect the divergent 
national understandings of strategic autonomy, overcoming them at this stage is a matter 
of political will rather than conceptual clarity. 
For the debate about whether conceptual ambiguity is conducive or hindering to 
cooperation, these findings suggests that it can be either or both. A common thread that 
ran through the interviews conducted for this research is the idea that words are important, 
but in the end actions matter more. Or to put it differently, whereas there can be 
conceptual ambiguity, this does not necessarily hinder practical cooperation. Instead, it 
can facilitate it as the idea behind ambiguous terms, such as “European strategic 
autonomy”, is essentially to inspire state actors to work together. Yet, none of that is to 
say that the different levels of ambition and often also different concerns that stem from 
the divergent understandings of the objective of strategic autonomy do not pose any 
challenges to cooperative action. The EU’s track record on defence integration as such 
shows that more often than not they do, leading to political hurdles and long negotiation 
processes. However, as the openness to interpretation is inherent to language and context 
plurality unavoidable, the policy-makers – at the national and EU level alike – should not 
focus on governing the conceptual ambiguity away, but rather find ways to operate under 
the conditions of multiplicity of interpretations by means of argumentation, deliberation, 
and persuasion.  
Taking into consideration the limitations of this study, several directions exist for future 
research. While the sample of five member states included in this study was carefully 
compiled to reflect diversity, other cases (in particular from Southern Europe) would help 
to further support the findings on the divergent understandings of the concept “strategic 
autonomy”. Similarly, the research on the impact of divergent interpretations on practical 
cooperation would benefit from studying other cases of defence cooperation formats 
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besides PESCO. This could also mean expanding the scope beyond the EU defence 
initiatives and including other multilateral European defence cooperation formats as 
subjects for analysis. Finally, as the EU defence cooperation moves forward, it would 
also be interesting to see if the ambition of strategic autonomy maintains its relevance, or 
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Appendix 1: List of Interviews 
 
FRANCE 















France to the EU 
Telephone 26.02.2019 
4FR Ministry of the 
Armed Forces 
Telephone 08.03.2019 










to the EU 
Telephone 08.02.2019 
2NL Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
In-person 22.02.2019 






to the EU 
Telephone 01.03.2019 
GERMANY 
Code Affiliation Interview 
Format 
Date 
1DE Ministry of 
Defence 
Skype 01.02.2019 




Germany to the 
EU 
Telephone 12.02.2019 
3DE Ministry of 
Defence 
Telephone 19.02.2019 






Politik, think tank 
Skype 08.03.2019 
FINLAND 













Finland to the EU 
Telephone 28.02.2019 
4FI Ministry of 
Defence 
Telephone 01.03.2019 






Number Affiliation Interview 
format 
Date 













4EE Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
In-person 15.03.2019 
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Appendix 2: Preliminary Interview Questions 
 
I: MEANINGS OF STRATEGIC AUTONOMY 
(1) From the perspective of your country, what are considered to be the most important 
steps that the EU should take to better care for its security?  
 (2) What does strategic autonomy of the EU entail? Thinking about it along the lines of 
its three main dimensions – decision-making, operations, industry – where should the EU 
level of ambition be? 
(3) How can the goal of strategic autonomy be best achieved? Are there any specific areas 
that should be focused on, e.g. more equal defence spending, developing high-end 
defence capabilities, formation of an European army etc.?  
(4) If the EU would achieve this goal of strategic autonomy, how would it affect the 
relationship between Europe and the United States? How does the idea of strategic 
autonomy fit into the current regional security architecture? 
 
II: PRACTICAL COOPERATION (main focus on PESCO) 
The EU has taken several steps aimed to support the process of closer cooperation in 
security and defence. These include PESCO, CARD, and the European Defence Fund.  
(5) How important do you see each of them for achieving strategic autonomy? Are they 
in principle supporting this goal or are there still some key issue areas that are not 
addressed by the current initiatives? 
 
(6) So far, how effective has PESCO been in fulfilling the high hopes that it has been 
surrounded with?  
 
(7) Are there any practical issues that have arisen during the implementation phase of 
the PESCO framework, or notable disagreements between the member states? 
 
(8) What is the position of your country on third party involvement in the EU defence 
and security initiatives, including PESCO projects? How does this decision interact 
with the overall goal of achieving strategic autonomy? 
 
(9) In your assesment, have the divergent understandings of „strategic autonomy“ among 
the member states resulted in any type of obstacles for practical cooperation within 
the PESCO framework? If so, then how? 
 
   84 
 
Appendix 3: Interview Consent Form 
 
 
INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM 
 
The European Union's Quest for Strategic Autonomy: Divergence of 
Understandings across Member States and Its Implications for Cooperation 
 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
 
You are being invited to participate in the research project “The European Union's Quest 
for Strategic Autonomy: Divergence of Understandings across Member States and Its 
Implications for Cooperation”. The study is carried out by the second year graduate 
student Elina Libek from Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies of the University of 
Tartu as part of her final thesis. The research project is supported by the Estonian Ministry 
of Defence. The information provided in this form is to help you decide whether you 
would like to take part in this study.  
 
Aims and implications of the research: This research will focus on the ongoing debates 
about deepening security and defence cooperation within the European Union (EU). The 
key concept explored in this study is idea of “strategic autonomy”, the meanings given to 
it among the EU member states and their practical implications. As a result of the 
deteriorating security environment of Europe, the EU has become increasingly vocal 
about the need for an increased capacity in the areas of defence and security. The 
initiatives taken in this regard often revolve around the goal of "strategic autonomy". 
Different EU member states, not to mention third parties, such as the U.S., however, seem 
to have a rather different understanding of what this greater autonomy should entail. The 
question explored in this research is: How do the divergent understandings of strategic 
autonomy among the EU member states affect practical cooperation to achieve this goal? 
The aim of the research project is to engage with theoretical debates related to meaning 
creation and security cooperation, and to offer policy-relevant insight into the matters of 
European security integration. 
 
Procedures of the research: Should you agree to participate, it will take approximately 
45 minutes of your time to be interviewed by the researcher from the University of Tartu. 
During the interview you will be asked to answer questions about your perceptions related 
to the meanings of “strategic autonomy” in the context of the European Union and the 
current state-of-the-art of practical cooperation aimed to achieve this goal. The interview 
will be audio-recorded to ensure that the researcher has an accurate record of the 
discussion. If you prefer not to be audio-recorded, please let the researcher know. Audio 
recording will be destroyed after the interview has been transcribed. The researcher will 
ensure protection of personal data and secure processing and storage of the gathered 
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Anonymity and confidentiality of personal data: Measures will be taken to protect the 
confidentiality and privacy of research participants. Interviewees remain anonymous and 
their responses will not be linked to their identity. Participants are free to withdraw from 
the project at any time and may skip a question if they feel uncomfortable giving an 
answer. The only person who will have access to the audio file and the transcription of 
the interview is the principal researcher from the University of Tartu, and any other person 
or agency required by law.  
 
Rights of research participants: You can choose not to participate in this study or 
withdraw your participation at any time during or after the research begins. Refusing to 
be in this study or deciding to discontinue participation will not affect your relationship 
with the researcher or the University of Tartu. Should you encounter problems as a direct 
result of being in this study, please contact the principal researcher listed at the end of this 
consent form.  
 
Informed consent: Agreeing to the interview means that you have read and understood 
this consent form, you have had your questions answered, and you have decided to be 
part of the research study.  
 
You are not expected to directly benefit from participating in this research study except 
for insight you might gain through answering the interview questions. If you are interested 
in obtaining a summary of research findings, please let the researcher know. If you have 
any additional questions before or during the study, you should talk to one of the contacts 













   86 
 
EUROOPA LIIDU PÜÜD STRATEEGILISE AUTONOOMIA SUUNAS: 





Sõnapaar “strateegiline autonoomia” on viimase paari aasta jooksul leidnud ühtviisi 
laialdast kasutust nii Euroopa Liidu (EL) strateegiadokumentides kui kohaliku poliitilise 
eliidi väljaütlemistes. Selle mõiste ebamäärasest laadist johtuvalt on tavapäraseks 
muutunud väide, et EL-i liikmesriigid omistavad “strateegilisele autonoomiale” väga 
erinevaid tähendusi. Ühise arusaama puudumine “strateegilise autonoomia” tähenduse 
osas on omakorda küsimärgi alla seadnud selle eesmärgi saavutamiseks vajaliku 
praktilisele koostöö võimalikkuse. Antud diskussioonidele tuginedes oli käesoleval 
uurimistööl kaks keskset eesmärki: Esiteks, kaardistada, kuidas tõlgendavad erinevad EL-
i liikmesriigid mõistet “Euroopa strateegiline autonoomia? Teiseks, uurida kuivõrd on 
antud kontseptsiooni ümbritsev arusaamade paljusus osutunud probleemiks EL-i 
raamistikus aset leidvale kaitsekoostööle, mis peaks strateegilise autonoomia kui 
eesmärgi saavutamist toetama? 
Uurimistöös seati fookuse alla mõiste “strateegiline autonoomia” tähendus viies 
liikmesriigis: Prantsusmaa, Holland, Saksamaa, Soome ja Eesti. Juhtumite valikul lähtuti 
liikmesriikide strateegilise kultuuri erisusest atlantisismi ja kontinentalismi spektrumil. 
“Strateegilise autonoomia” mõiste erinevate tõlgenduste mõju praktilisele koostööle 
uuriti EL-i alalise struktureeritud koostöö raamistiku (Permanent Structured Cooperation 
– PESCO) kontekstis. Sealjuures asetati rõhk sellele, kuidas liikmesriikide 
poliitikakujundajad ise tajuvad arusaamade mitmekesisuse mõju koostööle. Uuringu 
algandmete kogumiseks viidi läbi kokku 23 ekspertintervjuud valitsusametnike ning 
julgeoleku- ja kaitsepoliitika eksperdiga viiest uurimistöösse kaasatud liikmesriigist. 
Mis puutub “strateegilise autonoomia” erinevatesse tõlgendustesse, siis selle uurimistöö 
tulemused näitavad, et mõiste peamine tähendus on kõikides analüüsitud liikmesriikides 
sarnane, viidates Euroopa iseseisvale tegutsemisvõimekusele julgeoleku- ja 
kaitsepoliitika küsimustes. Sealjuures on liikmesriikide poliitikakujundajad paljuski 
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omaks võtnud analüütikute ja akadeemikute poolt välja toodud strateegilise autonoomia 
kolm peamist dimensiooni: poliitiline, operatiivne ja kaitsetööstuslik autonoomia. 
Lahknevused liikmesriikide arusaamades “strateegilise autonoomia” tähenduse osas 
kerkivad esile aga mõnevõrra reflektiivsemate küsimuste osas: kas “strateegilise 
autonoomia” lõppeesmärgiks peaks olema Euroopa iseseisvus oma julgeoleku tagamisel 
või on järkjärguline kaitsevõimekuse arendamine juba eesmärk omaette, kuidas paigutub 
strateegilise autonoomia ambitsioon Euroopa koostööparnerite suhtes 
(eksklusiivsus/inklusiivsus) ja kas Euroopa püüdu strateegilise autonoomia suunas 
nähakse kui potentsiaalset ohtu transatlantilistele väärtustele. 
Samaaegselt näitab selle uuringu teine peamine järeldus, et strateegilise autonoomia 
mõiste ebaselgus ei takista tingimata EL-i raamistikes toimuvat praktilist koostööd, mille 
eesmärk on seda toetada. Pigem tajuvad liikmesriikide poliitikakujundajad ühistegevust 
kui midagi, mis toob enesega kaasa suurema selguse ja aitab lõpuks kindlaks määrata 
liikmesriikide kollektiivse arusaama seatud eesmärkide tähendusest. See leid annab alust 
arvata, et olgugi, et oma olemustelt hägune, on “strateegilise autonoomia” mõiste aidanud 
kaasa liikmesriikide sama laua taha toomisele. Nüüd on peamiseks küsimuseks see, 
kuidas leida tasakaal erinevate ambitsioonide ja paljuski ka erinevate murekohtade vahel. 
Siinkohal aga on võtmesõnaks poliitiline tahe, mitte niivõrd “strateegilise autonoomia” 
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